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ABSTRACT

An abstract of the thesis of Todd Nathaniel Gilman for the Master of Arts in Political
Science presented October 1995.

Title: Communicative Action as Feminist Epistemology

This thesis proposes that feminist social and political theory adopt the epistemology
inherent in Jurgen Habermas's communicative ethics in order to more coherently work
toward the goal of freeing individuals from social oppression. This thesis first
examines the fundamental differences that exist between the particular claims for
knowledge made by the three major schools of feminist theory; the empirical feminists,
the standpoint feminists, and those allied with postmodernism. After illuminating the
specifics of these feminist claims, the conception of knowledge central to Habermas's
thought is explored and shown to be split into three distinct realms; the objective, the
social, and the subjective.
It is shown that the three realms of Habermas's knowledge account for the
underlying claims of the differing groups of feminist theory, and provide a basis for
reconciling the differences between them. Habermas's objective realm of knowledge
corresponds to the concerns of empirically oriented feminists. A need for an accurate
description of the events and conditions of the actual world is shared by both, as is a
trust in the human potential for grasping these objects and events accurately. Standpoint
feminism's concern for interpersonal relations, accounting for the context of an
individual's or group's existence, is reflected in the type of knowledge that Habermas
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considers social in nature. Habermas's conception of our capacity for social knowledge,
which guides our actions with other human beings, is shown to be dependent upon both
social existence and communication. Finally, Habermas acknowledges the human
potential for critical knowledge to explain the individual's ability to differentiate herself
from the group, a task which a postmodern feminism demands to avoid essentializing
any aspect of women.
If feminist theory is able to move beyond the entrenched differences that it now finds

itself locked within, perhaps then it will be able to continue with the project shared with
Habermas, that of providing a meaningful emancipation for human beings.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Feminist political and social theory today faces a dilemma, a dilemma which stems
from the foundations of its allegiance with a philosophical investigation into the ability
of the feminist political movement to deal with some of the most basic terms of its own
debate. Notions such as "justice," "woman," and "rationality" are hotly contested as
being either essential or antithetical to a project aimed toward the emancipation of
women. These disputed concepts revolve around what feminist scholars claim to
know, and what they claim can be known, about the nature of women specifically, and
humanity in general. What some scholars claim to know, others argue to be
unknowable, and the features of a theory that these scholars regard unknowable, still
others find essential to any feminist project. To resolve this discord, in a manner
agreeable to feminism as both a political and philosophical movement intent on human
emancipation, requires an explanation of a unified feminist "way of knowing," a
feminist epistemology.
Feminists, however, are not the only theorists involved in a questioning and
reconstruction of human understanding in a manner consistent with an emancipating
project. One of the most complete, recent investigations into these themes has been that
of Jilrgen Habermas. He also has begun with a question concerning what is possible
for human beings to know about the world, about a life in social interaction, and how it
would be to best guide our actions in this world. He has developed a strong
understanding of human social life based on a notion of communicative action, and

2
from this foundation he has moved to investigate what is possible and proper in social
ordering, outlined through a theory of discourse ethics. This inquiry has led Habermas
to new insights in the idea of knowledge and how it relates to moral and ethical
questions.
In this thesis, questions raised by the search for an acceptable feminist epistemology
will be compared to some of the central insights of Habermas's theory of discourse
ethics. Both share some criticisms of traditional Enlightenment epistemology while at
the same time depending deeply upon it for foundations. While both seek to move
away from many of the Enlightenment's tenets, both remain firmly and purposefully
tied to its central theme of working toward human emancipation, i.e., setting individuals
free from the tyranny of oppression. What both sets of theories reject as the flotsam
and jetsam of post-Enlightenment social science, combined with what both tie firmly to
the deck of their theory, suggests many interesting similarities. A comparison of what
remains on board and what is tossed to sea by both schools of thought may provide
insight for feminist theory in its attempt to become a coherent political and philosophical
movement.
This thesis seeks to explore fully the possibility of feminist political and
philosophical thought making a shift toward Habermas's philosophy of language. In
order for feminist theory as a whole to become more communicatively oriented,
Habermas's ethics will be required to demonstrate concern for the claims for knowledge
particular to each feminist school of thought. Habermas's treatment of empirical
concerns, his ability to account for our existence as embedded creatures, and yet our
ability to be individuals, will all be important considerations for comparison. Whether
or not Habermas's work in this area can be translated into real world improvements in
the lives of individuals remains to be seen. Certainly feminism, with its foundations in
social activism rather than academic philosophy, holds some advantage in this area, and

3
with some insight and conjecture, we may be able to see how a cooperative allegiance
between these two schools, rather than an uninformed misunderstanding, may help both
achieve their goal of a humanity free from domination.

FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGIES

The recognition that epistemological assumptions have political consequences has
kept a concern for a theory of knowledge a central theme in feminist writings. I A
theoretical self-understanding of the intellectual presuppositions of feminist inquiry
remains fundamental to understanding what various writers have referred to as
"women's ways of knowing" or "women's experience." These terms have represented
a feminist investigation into the realm of knowledge as well as a reluctance to adopt
'
uncritically the traditional terms of epistemological inquiry.2 But inquiry into

epistemology is also important for another philosophical tum which many feminists
have taken. Many now write that the terms and goals of the feminist project must be
more inclusive than is permitted by a singular investigation of issues of gender. If
feminist theory is to aim towards an emancipation of women, it must aim equally at the
ending of all varieties of oppression, as there are many 'types' of women oppressed by
many types of power. Any theory to liberate white, middle-class women must also
liberate working class women, women of color, and women oppressed due to their
status as citizens of third-world nations.3 These developments have begun to change the
focus of feminist theory.
I Kathleen Lennon and Margret Whitford, eds., Knowing the Difference: Feminist Perspectives
in Epistemology (New York: Routledge, 1994), 1.

2Linda Alcoff and Elizabeth Potter, "Introduction: When Feminisms Intersect Epistemology,"
chap in Feminist Epistemologies (New York: Routledge, 1993), 1-2.
3Linda Nicholson, ed., Feminism/Postmodernism (New York: Routledge, 1990), 1-4.
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Some of the earliest work in feminist theory was critical of the results of empirical
science as it had been traditionally practiced. Initial feminist insights saw that traditional
science had simply been done poorly, focused exclusively on the experience of men in
society and neglected the actual lives and existence of women. The idea followed that
an enlightened scientist, one aware of the traditional bias against women, would be able
to produce less biased, and more "scientific" results. These results would be inclusive
of the lives of both men and women, and a more accurate representation of all
individuals. This version of feminism pursues the goals of empirical science with a
more enlightened mission. Feminist empiricism has been praised as being a more
inclusive use of the traditions of scientific method.4
For many feminists, however, this method was inadequate for discovering and
exposing the androcentrism of traditional science. The plight of women could only be
fully understood through a scientific methodology

spec~fically

aware of the lives of

women, investigated from the perspective of women. This led feminists to build a
science from the standpoint of women, a standpoint fully aware of their
underprivileged position in society, and aware of the role that women have played in
society. 5 This science is aware of women's experience with care and connectedness,
with home labor, and importantly, her experience as an outsider.6 This standpoint
would incorporate emotion and feeling, and would be directly opposed to the objectivity
and disinterestedness of empiricism, even feminist empiricism. These feminists are

4For further explanation see: Aµ{son Jaggar, Feminist Politics and Human Nature (Sussex:
Rowman and Allanheld, 1983), 355-358.
5see for example: Jaggar, Feminist Politics; and Sandra Harding, Whose Science? Whose
Knowled2e? Thinkin2 From Women's Lives (lthica: Cornell University Press, 1991).
6For further examples which emphasize women's experiences see Nancy Chodorow, ~
Reproduction of Motherin~ (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978); and Nancy Hartsock,
Money. Sex. and Power- Toward a Feminist Historical Materialism (New York: Longman, 1986).
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very firm in their criticism of traditional Cartesian dualism, the philosophical separation
of mind and body, and any acceptable theory of interaction for them will need to
account for our existence as physical as well as thinking creatures. Further, in addition
to embodiedness, feminist analysis in many disciplines has emphasized the significance
of the context of investigation. 7 This has led many feminist writers to question the
feasibility of any universal knowledge that might be independent of physical existence
and location. With recognition of embodiment comes a recognition of difference
between groups of humans, and any universal connection between them will need to be
carefully defended. With human physical existence there will need to be a clearer
understanding of what it is that makes us human, and why there is any conception of a
"correct" order to interaction or morality.
But this science too is insufficient and inappropriate for the demands of another
group of feminist scholars. First, standpoint science continues to rely upon many of the
assumptions of misogynist science. Second, a reliance upon a 'feminist standpoint'
seems to identify a way of being that is uniquely and cross culturally female. This
essentialism becomes problematic as the point of view of women of color, lesbians, or
women of the third world are incorporated into "feminism." To reject this assigned
way of being, some feminists have turned towards an allegiance with postmodernism in
order to account for each individual as different, unique, and not dependent on any
particular understanding of being female. Postmodern feminism is opposed to the
objectivity of positivism or the possibility of objective knowledge at all. 8 A postmodern
epistemology is devised such that no individual is predetermined to a way of being and

7Alcoff and Potter, "When Feminisms Intersect Epistemology," I.
Ssee Jane Flax, "Postmodernism and Gender Relations in Feminist Theory," in
Feminism/Postmodernism, ed. Linda Nicholson (New York: Routledge, 1990), 39-62.
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each individual is allowed to exist in their own particular context, embedded, but not
pre-determined. 9

This more recent tum of feminism, however, has also left many wanting, as writers
have begun to question what an alliance with postmodemism brings to their struggle.
What is left of 'feminism' if there is no functioning category of "woman"? What is left
of the world of connection that women turned to in the standpoint theories if each is
radically unconnected and differentiated?lO These questions have led feminist writers to
back away from the claims of postmodemism to seek another, more coherent
understanding of human life. This new understanding will be required to remain true to
the underlying goal of feminist theory, that of emancipation for women, but it will also
need to be aware of the critiques of each of the above attempts towards a feminist
epistemology. To date, there is only an understanding of the inadequacies of previous
attempts at feminist epistemology. Feminist writers have only pointed towards the
direction this next theory might take and there has been no fully successful attempt at
this latest development in feminist theory.

JURGEN HABERMAS

The third chapter of this thesis seeks to explore a possible source of enlightenment
for this next stage in the development of feminist epistemology. Here we travel to the
European continent, the Frankfurt School and Jiirgen Habermas's development of a

9see Donna Haraway, "A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist
Feminism in the 1980s, " in Feminism/Postmodernism, ed. Linda Nicholson (New York:
Routledge, 1990), 190-234.
I Osee Christine Di Stefano, "Dilemmas of Difference: Feminism, Modernity, and
Postmodernism," in Feminism/Postmodernism, ed. Linda Nicholson (New York: Routledge, 1990),
63-82.
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theory of communicative action and discourse ethics. The epistemology involved in his
work has not yet been fully explored by feminist writers, and may provide valuable
insight into human interaction for feminist epistemology.
Habermas has been credited by many writers as having been influential in shifting a
great deal of philosophical debate from a philosophy of consciousness to a philosophy
of language. This has grown out of Habermas's need to explain the insufficiency of
traditional empirical-analytic science's ability to explain fundamental human
phenomena. With this shift, Habermas has worked to expand the notion of rationality
from a strictly strategic understanding to a more complex and inclusive notion capable
of explaining human abilities to achieve mutual understanding. While the empiricalanalytic sciences provide important information for much of our existence, they must be
supplemented by other types of science, based on other types of knowledge.
Habermas's thinking is founded upon a conception of human social life as
"communicative action" which forms the bases of all human interaction and our social
existence. I I The development of human social life has been intertwined with our ability
to symbolically mediate our interactions, and cannot be adequately understood without
an understanding of how language is a part of our interaction. Each human community
depends fundamentally on a background know ledge of these symbolic interactions
which coordinate all other interactions. This background knowledge, shared by all
members of a community is referred to as their lifeworld. Human beings are seen as
dependent on this lifeworld and on our linguistic abilities, for both our knowledge and
our identities.
I I See Jilrgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, volume l, Reason and the
Rationalization of Society, trans. by Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984; original
German edition published by Suhrkamp Verlag, 1981); and Jurgen Habermas, The Theory of
Communicative Action, volume 2, Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason,
trans. by Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987; original German edition published by
Suhrkamp Verlag, 1981).
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Habermas has also begun to devise a detailed understanding of what universally
connects human beings. 12 As all human beings depend on their lifeworld in order to
successfully communicate with other individuals, there must be a method of mediation
that enables the repair of interruptions, or misunderstandings about the lifeworld. This
process of reaching agreement about what counts as valid for a background assumption
is universally used in human communities. Without such a process, human interaction
would occur upon a broken and incoherent set of assumptions which would make
mutual understanding between individuals impossible. Habermas's claims for this
process are not based on any mystical understanding about the nature of reaching
consensus, but are instead carefully based on what would be empirically necessary for
communication to occur at all.
From this understanding of a universal connection between social actors, Habermas
shows how ethical norms are worked out in communities, and how they come to be
accepted as valid by all members of that community. This will also explain how some
of these norms come to be challenged by other members of that community, and are
seen as valid or invalid when challenged before the more universally accepted criteria
for validity. This is an important development which feminists will need to pay
particular attention to, as it demonstrates how new and radically different ways of
knowing might come to be more accepted, as feminist theory aims to accomplish.

12 See Jurgen Habennas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, trans. by Christian

Lenhart and Shierry Weber Nicholson (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993; original German edition
published by Suhrkamp Verlag, 1983); and Jurgen Habennas, Justification and Application:
Remarks on Discourse Ethics. trans. by Ciaran P. Cronin (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993;
original German edition published by Suhrkamp Verlag 1990 and 1991 ).
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SYNTHESIS

The fourth chapter of this thesis will explore the ability of Habermas's epistemology
to satisfy the criteria demanded by a feminist political theory. While a limited number
of feminist writers have explored a few, specific aspects of Habermas's theory, 13 there
has been neither a full feminist examination of communicative action's epistemic
foundations, nor of Habermas's latest writings on the universal aspects of discourse
ethics. One intent of this investigation will be to show that transitions made by feminist
theory from empiricism, through standpoint theory and postmodernism, has led
feminist theory back to the project of the Enlightenment and its original intentions.
Following this return, it still remains unclear how feminist political and philosophical
thought can reconcile the deep divisions within its own work. This paper's use of
Habermasian thought will demonstrate how many of the same concerns faced by
feminists have been fairly treated and successfully integrated into a single theory in
Habermas's theory of communicative action. It will be shown how many of the
concerns incorporated by Habermas could be acceptable to the many camps within
feminist theory.
First, it will be shown that Habermas and the feminists have similar ideas on the
nature of knowledge. Again, both reject most concepts of a single "gods-eye" approach
to what can be known by agents. Discourse ethics removes reliance upon a single,
'proper' way of life that all communities must adhere to. Habermas also uses an

l 3For examples of these partial feminist critiques of Habermas see: Nancy Fraser, "What's
Critical About Critical Theory? The Case of Habermas and Gender," chap. in Unruly Practices:
Power. Discourse. and Gender in Contemporary Social Theory (Minneapolis, University of
Minnesota Press, 1989), 113-143; or Marie Flemming, "Women's Place in Communicative
Reason," in Women and Reason, eds. Elizabeth Harvey and Kathleen Okruhlik (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 1992), 254-262.
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understanding of validity claims to knowledge rather than relying upon a notion of the
truth of a knowledge claim. Further, as many feminists have rejected the claim to

objectivity that has founded much of Western science, Habermas's reliance on reasons
will again be attractive. For Habermas, the validity of a claim to knowledge is not based
on the vantage point from which the knowledge is derived, but rather because reasons
acceptable to all can be offered to support the claim. Finally, as many feminists have
critiqued the flaws of an instrumental rationality, the notion of rationality will be
explored and shown compatible.
Similarities shared by Habermas and feminists concerning epistemic agency will
also be explored. As called for by many feminist epistemologies, Habermas builds
communicative action in specific opposition to Cartesian notions that truth or meaning
can be discovered through a solitary endeavor. There is no separation of knower and
knowing in communicative action. Further, there is a specific emphasis on human
interconnectedness for both individual identity and a sense of community. This is
compatible with feminist concern for caring and mutual awareness that has been absent
in most western philosophy. The linguistic grounding of these aspects of human
existence also removes any dependence on special, exclusive criteria for rationality or
'humanness.' Certain uses of these criteria have long been used to exclude women and
other "irrationals" from philosophical importance. In communicative action, however,
any actor capable of speech is a focus of consideration.
Criteria concerning the justification of knowledge are also of fundamental concern to
both Habermas and feminist theory. While Habermas has been selective in
incorporating any assumptions of the Enlightenment into his works, he believes that
important aspects of the Enlightenment must be retained if the project of human
emancipation from oppression is to be realized. Although much of feminist theory is
directly hostile to the Enlightenment, some feminists too have recently realized that to
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reject all standards of judgment leaves no criteria left to consider the justness of human
relations. If feminists seek the emancipation of women, they too must retain some idea
of what it will mean to be free of domination. The justification of knowledge, where
Habermas and some feminists have begun to engage directly the postmodernist
challenge to any universal concepts, will be the final key to showing how feminist
theory can move together with Habermas toward a human existence free from
oppression.

CHAPTER II

FEMINIST WAYS OF KNOWING

For the past three decades, feminist theory has been engaged in a critique of the
products, methods, and assumptions of the scientific inquiry into human social and
political interaction. This continuing feminist investigation has led to questioning the
foundations of knowledge itself, challenging our ability to know answers to some of the
most basic problems of human social life. In order to know about how we should
interact, we must be clear about what we can know about ourselves and about each
other. For feminists, responding to this challenge means a careful consideration of the
social role and identity of women as individuals in communal life. This clarification
concerns epistemological assumptions, and how they relate to moral and ethical
questions of human interaction.
Feminist philosophers have argued for and against of a number of differing
approaches to create this feminist knowledge. Some remain tied to the traditions of
empiricism, to notions of objectivity, and the idea that a knowledge unmediated by
circumstance and appearing to be universal, is achievable, desirable, and that its further
acquisition will lead to human emancipation. Others write that knowledge can never be
more than particular, and that any "universal" knowledge only serves male dominance,
not the liberation of women. Another battle revolves around the correct understanding
of what it means to be a woman, and whether or not one's sex deeply unites a group of
individuals, or whether gender is only one of many peripheral aspects of one's being.
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Finally, there is a debate over the criteria for validating claims to any of this knowledge,
what these criteria would be, or whether there is any true "validity" at all.
Whether or not a resolution of these debates is possible is not yet known, but a
number of feminists continue working to develop a theory of feminist knowledge
which may transcend these differences and be acceptable to all of these groups. A brief
exploration of what these attempts have entailed, and the debates surrounding their
separate projects will prove useful in understanding the wide range of demands that
feminist theory makes upon an epistemology. These include some very powerful
critiques of traditional Western epistemology, and some very enlightening claims for
consideration in the future development of any acceptable theory of human knowledge.
In addition to gaining insight into the strengths and weakness of current feminist
thought, this chapter will point out steps which feminist theory will need to take as it
seeks to resolve its internal disagreements. The overview to follow will examine major
developments in contemporary feminist theory: empiricism, standpoint theory, and
postmodernism, while attempting to avoid becoming bogged down in the myriad of
specific positions within each of them. The chapter will show that none of these options
remain uncontested, as none presents an epistemology wholly compatible with a
coherent feminist theory. Examination of the parallels between these theories, along
with the rifts between them, will point this inquiry towards the direction feminist
epistemology must take to become a coherent political and philosophical movement.
This task should further assist us in seeing the ways feminist theory remains engaged in
the debate over how an epistemology can be devised to strengthen and support the aims
of a social, political, and philosophical movement seeking the emancipation of human
beings.
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FEMINIST EMPIRICISM

The first appearance of a feminist science oriented to the demands of women began
in fields oriented toward empirical science, and remains tied to these epistemological
claims within their philosophical investigation. Even before feminism began its critique
of the foundations of knowledge, feminists were actively employing the empirical
sciences to ask questions about the adequacy of theories concerning women in biology,
anthropology, and sociology. Whether or not these sciences were fairly portraying the
lives and experiences of women, in their claims to study 'all mankind,' was seriously
questioned. Feminist critiques argued that most social science had been built upon
models developed within a world dominated by males, and the results of those studies
had thus been "limited by the particular interests, perspectives and experiences" of
males. I A science limited in such a fashion, excluding from consideration one-half of
its supposed population and focusing on the interests of the other half, is not faithful to
the ideals of scientific inquiry. These feminists argue that social biases, androcentrism,
and a subsequent misapplication of scientific method, have been the root cause of poor
science in the past. Poorly conducted science has resulted in the formation of false
beliefs, guiding attention towards improper scientific questions, which when answered,
provide scientific knowledge tainted by the original biases. These feminists argue for
changes to be made in scientific communities to end these biases and expand scientific
knowledge to its fullest potential.
This group of feminists, who have worked to end the androcentric bias in science,
while leaving scientific method as it is, have been labeled "feminist empiricists" by
I Marcia Millman and Rosabeth Moss Kantor, Another Voice: Feminist Perspectives on Social
Life and Social Science (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1975), viii.
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Sandra Harding, or "liberal feminists" by Allison Jaggar.2 Such a feminist science
works to correct the tradition which often excludes women as being irrational, not 'fully
human,' or dependent upon men for support. These feminists intend to include women
in the scientific process, as both the subjects and objects of inquiry, to understand
women's experiences as fully and legitimately human lives. Helen Longina described
feminist empiricism as centrally concerned with designing research for women rather
than merely about women, requiring a special consideration of the specific contexts of
women's lives. She further questions what actual benefit there might be from
'discovering' any new epistemology. To what degree is it true that "if we could just get
the epistemology right, we would get the science right"?3 It does not seem that we can
simply dismiss all of the accumulated knowledge that has been produced in the last few
hundred years by traditional science.

Away From "Bad Science"
Empirical feminists are particularly interested in critiquing the poor execution of
otherwise good science. They are concerned that the methods of traditional science have
been applied in a restricted fashion, and that removing these limitations and expanding
the realm of scientific inquiry would vastly expand the usefulness and acceptability of
knowledge to humanity. Feminist empiricists accept the philosophical bases of
scientific inquiry, and seek to finally fulfill its primary goal, arriving at a true knowledge
of the world. This will be achieved by rejecting the biased assumptions with which the

2see Allison Jaggar, Feminist Politics. 355-358; and Sandra Harding, "Rethinking Standpoint
Epistemology: What Is 'Strong Objectivity,'" in Feminist Epistemologies, eds. Linda Alcoff and
Elizabeth Potter (New York: Routledge, 1993), 49-82.
3ttelen E. Longino, "Subjects, Power, and Knowledge: Description and Prescription in Feminist
Philosophies of Science," in Feminist Epistemologies, eds. Linda Alcoff and Elizabeth Potter
(New York: Routledge, 1993), 101.
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method had previously been applied. To these feminists, the use of "bad science,"
science which has been guided by a sexist bias, has been responsible for many of the
poor, and incomplete results of past science.
This misapplication of scientific method can be seen in the role of women portrayed
in traditional models of social life used in the social sciences. These models represent
as typical and significant social interaction, realms where only males commonly exist as
actors, areas such as work or politics, and away from locations of women's activity, the
home, the grocery, or the laundry.4 The importance of the "mundane," private aspects
of social life become more important in feminist science, acknowledging that these are
aspects of both men's and women's lives.5 They argue for a shift in our perception of
social relations; for example, changing the focus of the study of vast social
organizations from management to the majority of these groups composed of
secretaries and office workers,6 or rethinking the reverence to the male "genius artists"
of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries who depended upon the social structure's
support of change and development, a social structure made up significantly of
women. 7 In other cases the results of this science were actually seen as hostile towards
women, where androcentric science had proved capable of producing "valid" scientific
research able to legitimize rape, or proving the genetic superiority of males at

4Lyn H. Lofland, "The "Thereness" of Women: A Selective Review of Urban Sociology," in
Another Voice: Feminist Perspectives on Social Life and Social Science, eds. Marcia Millman
and Rosabeth Moss Kantor (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1975), 144-170.
5Millman and Kantor, Another Voice, xii-xiii.
6Rosabeth Moss Kantor, "Women and the Structure of Organizations: Explorations in Theory
and Behavior," in Another Voice: Feminist Perspectives on Social Life and Social Science, eds.
Marcia Millman and Rosabeth Moss Kantor (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1975), 34-74.
7Gaye Tuchman, "Women and the Creation of Culture," in Another Voice: Feminist
Perspectives on Social Life and Social Science, eds. Marcia Millman and Rosabeth Moss Kantor
(Garden City: Anchor Books, 1975), 171-202.
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mathematics. 8 Feminist empiricists hope to alter the science which has produced and
reproduced forces that keep women subjugated by and subordinate to men.
An important improvement for science would be the development of alternative
models to relieve the "systematic blindness" of science to social reality. A refocusing of
scientific models would not exclude men, but rather include the study of women, thus
creating a more complete understanding of human life, involving both men and
women. Research ought to be done with the elimination of androcentric biases,
producing more objective, non-political, and "scientific" results. A process of
systematic observation, with the observer guided by strict adherence to neutral
procedures, will lead to the eradication of sexism necessary for truly scientific results.
These observers will most certainly no longer be exclusively male if this bias is to be
avoided, and the addition of female scientists will be a first step towards seeing that
science is not simply 'male-centered. '9 Thus, by following the prescriptions of what
has long been understood as the scientific method, a better, more encompassing science
will be established. Feminists in this tradition intend no special privileges for women,
seeking only that equal opportunity be given to all individuals to be both subject and
object of scientific inquiry. There should be no discrimination in science because of
sex.10 Further, by not departing radically from "science as usual," feminist empiricism
is argued to be more readily accepted by established science.

8Karen Messing, "The Scientific Mystique: Can a White Lab Coat Guarantee Purity in the
Search for Knowledge about the Nature of Women?" in Women's Nature: Rationalizations of
Inequality. eds. Marian Lowe and Ruth Hubbard (New York: Pergamon Press, 1983), 75-85.
9Messing, "The Scientific Mystique," 84-85.
1OJaggar,

Feminist Politics, 357.
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The "Subject" of Knowled~e
Important characteristics of the empirical feminist's epistemology can be illustrated
through the agent of knowledge empiricism presupposes. Positivist science relies upon
the Cartesian notion of a separation between mind and body. The body is seen to
remain tied to subjective impulses which should not be allowed to influence the pure,
objective processes of the mind in searching for scientific knowledge. As each mind is
capable of pure thought, rejecting the influences of physical existence is the only way of
achieving universal, scientific knowledge. Only knowledge produced free from the
influences of physical existence or characteristics of the body is sought, thus feminist
empiricists do not seek to identify the differences that men or women might claim as
knowledge, as these differences are rejected as biased. Disembodiment allows subjects
to be unitary, homogeneous and identical in their completeness. These individuals
produce knowledge which is consistent and coherent. Knowledge is not produced by a
community or by social groups, where there may be differences within or between
groups. A heterogeneous subject, or multiple subjects, might produce knowledge that
is inconsistent or incoherent. I I
Another distinctive trait of empiricism concerns not the disembodiment of the
scientist, but assumptions about scientific interactions, where objects of research are
studied by scientific subjects.12 This subject is a central figure in empirical, positivist
research, neither historically attached to her surroundings, nor linked to the object
studied. Neither the subject's existence nor the investigation itself has a significant effect
upon the objects being studied. Feminist empiricism retains these scientific separations,

11 Harding,

"Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology," 63.

l 2Jbid., 63-64.
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between a subject's mind and body, as wen as between scientific subjects and objects to
be studied.

The Objective Nature of Knowledge
Feminists within this tradition accept assumptions concerning the existence of a
world independent of human attempts to understand it, and that true human know ledge
of this world's existence is possible. There is no challenge to norms of empirical
research, such as detached observation or of fallibility, only to the incompleteness of the
empirical research that has gone before. Scientific results are properly based upon the
experience of individuals, and information gained through sensory experiences.
Empirical feminism is not less objective than previous science, but rather emphasizes
the desirability of objective knowledge, and more rigorously pursues its achievement.
These feminists argue that they hold the point of view of the truly rational, unattached
observer and are thus able to provide the most unbiased and objective understanding of
human actions possible.13
With all knowledge based in experience, there is a traditional scientific intent to
separate the normative and empirical aspects of knowledge. The normative, evaluative,
and judgmental aspects of knowledge are all excluded from empirical science. The
empirical is objective, observable, and thus, universal, not relying upon any particular
characteristic of the subject to be accepted. Any consideration of the observer's values,
interests, and emotions is rejected since these would bias the scientific results. The
result of this unbiased method is objective knowledge, the goal of positive scientific
method. Philosophy of science is relied upon to construct rules which provide a guide
to drawing inferences from these experiences.14 With strict adherence to scientific
13 Jaggar, Feminist Politics, 357-8.
14 Ibid.,

355-57.
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method any other observer, male or female, will be able to agree with the scientific
account of what has been described.

Politics of Empiricism

The political result of a feminism guided by the goal of applying the traditional
assumptions and methods of scientific inquiry, is an alliance with the traditional
Western movement to emancipate individuals, the Enlightenment. These feminists are
comfortable working within the claims, assumptions, and goals of the liberal tradition,
and argue for an application of liberal principles with a more strict adherence to their
nature. "Liberal feminism" remains founded upon a notion of human nature being
individualistic, with no necessary connection between these separate actors.15 It
accounts for actors, working from calculated, rational choices, as atomistic and isolated
individuals who have no interconnections with other actors that significantly relate to
their being.
Liberal feminists seek no special privileges for women, and only defend a claim to
equal rights and equal opportunity for all. There is commonly an argument for "sexual
equality" and the creation of gender neutral policies of social organization. Therefore
liberal feminists feel the benefits of their theory will be apparent and appealing to all. If
men rationally apply the criteria for objectivity to the traditional emphasis on male
interests, they too will see the soundness and justness of a liberalism enlightened by the
feminist movement. The advantages of this political theory are apparent from the
position of a rational detached observer, the observer central to the claims of this
understanding of science.

15Jbid., 357-358.
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THE FEMINIST STAND POINT

For many feminists, however, this reliance on the traditional methodology and goals
of empirical science does not arrive at the core difficulty in emancipating women from a
male-dominated world. It is argued that power relations are structured by those able to
decide what knowledge is and how it functions, and that continued reliance upon
knowledge legitimated by a tradition of men does not allow women to achieve the
power that they need in order to free themselves of male dominance. Power is seen as
fundamentally connected to knowledge, and in order to posses their own power,
women must to be able to use a knowledge created from the experience women have
had in their lives. An alternative science can be created, based upon this knowledge and
power, and opposed to science built upon a male understanding of knowledg~ and a
male possession of power. By working within a knowledge built upon a woman's
perception of the world, this science hopes to more clearly discern the oppression of
male dominance, to more fully understand the significance of women in social life, and
empower women with the ability to free themselves from male oppression.
The creation of a feminist standpoint science, based upon a feminist knowledge and
understanding of the world, has been explored by many influential authors in the
feminist camp.16 This tum of emphasis in feminist epistemology is placed by some in
the late 1970s, when a deeper "hermeneutics of suspicion" emerged in feminist
theory .17 Concern grew that one's perspective on reality, and one's style of thinking, as
well as the questions asked in investigation, may be influenced by a gender bias. These

l 6see Allison Jaggar, Feminist Politics; Sandra Harding, Whose Science?: or Nancy Hartsock,
Money. Sex. and Power. as only a few of the possible examples.

17 Susan Bordo, "Feminism, Postmodernism, and Gender-Skepticism," in
Feminism/Postmodernism, ed. Linda Nicholson (New York: Routledge, 1990), 143.
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theorists hold that all knowledge claims are made from some particular location, some
particular point of view, and based upon some foundational beliefs. Any claim to be
free of this embeddedness in location, the often claimed "God's-eye-view" from
positive science, is untenable. Standpoint theorists claim that traditional science has
been done from the unquestioned and uncriticized standpoint of men, supporting and
continuing the domination of women in society. Thus, if a foundational standpoint is
unavoidable for any science, a more appropriate and less oppressive science would be
achieved by replacing the male oriented foundation with a female standpoint, a feminist
view of science.
Sandra Harding compares the feminist rejection of traditional science to the rejection
of what Thomas Kuhn referred to as a "normal" or "mature" science. IS In a mature
science the conceptual and methodological assumptions are shared and accepted by
most inquirers in a field. As Kuhn argues, there is no reason to believe that a consensus
among scientists guarantees an ultimate, or "more correct" know ledge of the actual
nature of the world. The creation of a feminist standpoint is then a move towards a
"successor science."19 Women need their own understanding of social life, an
understanding which is aware that daily activity contains an interpretation of the world
and an understanding of how power relationships are at work in a society .20 Standpoint
theorists claim neither traditional nor postmodern theories of knowledge provide

18 Sandra Harding, "The Instability of the Analytical Categories of Feminist Theory," in
Feminist Theory in Practice and Process, eds. Micheline R. Malson, Jean F. O'Barr, Sarah
Westphal-Whil, and Mary Wyer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 18. See also
Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1970).
l 9Mary Hawkes worth, "Knowers, Knowing, Known: Feminist Theory and Claims of Truth," in
Feminist Theory in Practice and Process, eds. Micheline R. Malson, Jean F. O'Barr, Sarah
Westphal-Whil, and Mary Wyer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 330.

20Nancy Hartsock, "Foucault on Power: A Theory for Women?" in Feminism/Postmodernism,
ed. Linda Nicholson (New York: Routledge, 1990), 168-172.
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women with the power to end their historic subjugation to men, and that only a new,
specifically feminist science can provide the ability to clear away the illusions of the old

science.
Two of the earliest influential writings concerning a female point of view were those
of Nancy Chodorow and Carol Gilligan. 21 Chodorow's work investigated the
psychological development of women as opposed to the development of men, creating
a theory that essentially described the ways of women's knowing, based on an
interpretation of women's social experiences. Building upon this argument, Gilligan's
research concerning a "different voice" pointed out the traditional androcentrism of
psychology, specifically the model of moral development created by Lawrence
Kohlberg. Gilligan argued that his theory was necessarily incomplete by focusing its
model specifically upon the experience of men and boys. Her book explored the terms
of women's moral discourse in order to investigate its own standards of development.
In this way she created a feminine "counter-model" to moral development specific to
women, differing from that of men. 22

A way from Objectivity
A feminist standpoint acknowledges the benefits and accomplishments of feminist
science pursued within the confines of an empiricist paradigm, but criticizes the feminist
reaction to the traditions of "bad science" as not strong enough. Relying upon the
norms and methods of "science as usual" is too weak to systematically identify the
2 l Nancy Chodorow, The Reproduction of Motherin1:; and Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice:
Psycholo~ica]

Theory and Women's Development (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982).

22 For a discussion of how Gilligan's final conc1usion remains an essential description of
women's moral development, even though it relies upon some empirical methodologies, see Nancy
Fraser and Linda Nicholson, "Social Criticism Without Philosophy: An Encounter Between
Feminism and Postmodemism," in Feminism/Postmodernism, ed. Linda Nicholson (New York:
Routledge, 1990), 32-33.
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biases upon which such a science is structured. The notion of objectivity has not been
endowed with enough power to detect the sexist and androcentric assumptions that are
the dominant beliefs of the modem period.23 The very idea of objectivity in knowledge
is rejected, as a feminist standpoint finds all knowledge embedded and contextual, and
therefore saturated in the value that positivism claims to be free of.
Standpoint feminism also rejects the traditional foundations for science because of
the knowledge claims rejected or excluded by empirical science. Within scientific
communities a group of qualified observers develop whose claims to knowledge are
accepted, while claims from those who do not meet this community's criteria for
acceptance are rejected. 24 Further, the knowledge claims which these communities
consider valid are extremely limited. Only knowledge claims unattached to particular
circumstances are accepted as knowledge, and those claims tied to emotions or
supported by a particular interpretation of history or cultural position were rejected. The
scientific community has been so oriented to focus on value-free claims, that it has also
tended to exclude claims from those individuals who are seen to typify those values.
These rejected individuals, who embody the characteristics of emotion, culture, or
history, have commonly been women and those from colonized groups25.
Standpoint theory seeks to embrace those rejected by empiricism, women or the
colonized, who embody gender, emotion, or history. This rejection of traditional
rationality has led some to label the movement of feminist standpoint science as "anti-

23 Harding, "Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology," 51-52.
24Jbid. 70.

25 Alison Jaggar, "Love and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist Epistemology," in Women and
Reason, eds. Elizabeth Harvey and Kathleen Okruhlik (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,
1992), 115-142.
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rationalism. "26 Standpoint theory openly confronts the historical use of the term
"rational" as a means of denigrating women as the "irrational." In response to this
history, standpoint theory seeks to valorize this excluded and denigrated 'other,' and to
build a science upon her "irrational" characteristics. This leads to a science which
includes concepts of emotion, nature, body, and intuition. The standpoint project would
hope to build a social order that accommodates women in all of their female differences,
rather than sanitize individuals into imperfect and ununique copies of the "everyman."

Embedded Subjects of Know led~e
In addition to claiming the contextuality of knowledge, feminist standpoint theory
demands consideration for the embodiment of the subject of knowledge. Jaggar writes
that the conception of human nature is essential to feminism, and begins with a rejection
of classical Cartesian dualism, the separation of the mind and body. Reliance on a
dualism, separation of mind and body, leads science toward "political skepticism and
solipsism. "27 This stems from the liberal assumption that individuals are solitary and
have needs and interests that are separate and in competition with other individuals.
This, however, is an unrealistic picture of humans, even if one assumes only healthy
adults, as the necessity of reproductive biology alone points to the impossibility of selfsufficiency. Ignoring biological existence deprives liberals from the most basic way of
identifying human needs.
Abstract individualism assumes that essential human characteristics are derived prior
to any social context. Jaggar feels, however, that meaning is given to inner experience
and behavior only by the emotions, beliefs, and attitudes given to us by our social
26christine Di Stefano, "Dilemmas of Difference: Feminism, Modernity, and Postmodemism,"
in Feminism/Postmodernism, ed. Linda Nicholson (New York: Routledge, 1990), 67.
27 Jaggar, Feminist Politics, 40.
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context. Contemporary research also has shown that many cognitive and emotional
differences stem from sexual differences. If these points are even partially true, then the
idea of a "presocial human being with out any determinate kind of nature is conceptually
incoherent. "28 Central to the liberal idea of rationality is autonomy or self-definition. If,
however, the central needs, desires, and beliefs of the individual are based on those of
society, then the ultimate authority of the individual comes into question. In addition,
liberal rationality is connected with the need for the individual to maximize their selfinterest. Jaggar feels that while this egoism may be an accurate model for males, this
has not historically been the role of women.
Another consequence of the embodiment of subjects is the rejection of the positivist
conception of an unattached observer recording the actions of a distinct object of study.
As was stated above, there is to be no ideal vantage point from which to observe, no
God's-eye or universal position. With the rejection of any unembedded position, the
distinction between subject and object begins to atrophy. The subjects are as "real and
visible" as any object. Further, there becomes no object that is not touched by the
existence of the subject. All observers must interpret whatever it is that they perceive,
whether a social or a physical phenomenon, the line separating the two is gone.29 This
conception of the scientific observer will allow investigation to account for the
attachments that individuals, observer and observed, have in the world. It will also
allow a greater role for gender, attachment, and emotion in scientific inquiry, factors that
are an inescapable component of human social life.
A key part of human interaction stems from our emotional interaction, another
aspect of human life which has not been adequately considered by traditional science.

28Jbid., 42.
29ttarding, "Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology," 63-64.
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Jaggar writes that traditional epistemology treats emotion with suspicion and hostility. 30
In the positivist tradition, emotions only play a role as the stimulus that begins a
scientific investigation, prodding the scientist to begin an investigation. In the testing
and judgment of these hypotheses, however, the focus upon "replicability" works to
cancel out all emotional influences. While this distinction between discovery and
verification may filter out the values of individual researchers, it does not remove the
values of the social context of the investigation. 31 Emotions and values are a part of the
scientific enterprise, at all levels. Feminist standpoint theory argues that for science to
be accurate requires that it be able to acknowledge the continuous interaction between
"how we understand the world and who we are as people."32 To allow the full
development of knowledge will then require a better understanding of the important role
that emotions play in its acquisition.
Another development in the nature of the subjects of knowledge concerns their
identity. In empirical science there was always an emphasis on the individual
discoverer of knowledge, of the individual who was able to observe and to understand.
In a standpoint theory, however, individuals no longer produce knowledge, which is
instead seen as the creation of communities. Standpoint theory holds that any
"discovery" of knowledge only becomes valid after it has been accepted by the
community .33 Further, the agents of knowledge in a feminist standpoint claim to be
"heterogeneous and multiple," representing the feminist claim that there is no ideal type
of agent, no singular way of being that is able to discover and posses legitimate

30 Allison Jaggar, "Love and Knowledge," 115-142.
31Jbid., 126-127.
32Jbid., 135.
33Harding, "Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology," 65.
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knowledge. The knowledge claims of these heterogeneous communities of knowledge
are intended to be compatible with the claims of other marginalized groups, who have
also been excluded from making knowledge claims.

A New Type of Knowled~e
A central claim made from the feminist standpoint concerns the value-content of
knowledge, where all knowledge is held to be contextual. All claims to knowledge are
embedded in a history and social existence, and to consider knowledge separate from
these influences is to follow a false ideal. The isolated, detached, ideal-observer which
is found in so many empirical epistemologies, has no place in a standpoint theory.
Again, if there is no ideal location or perspective from which to observe, and any
vantage point is value laden, feminist standpoint theory argues that the best vantage
point to choose for scientific inquiry is that of women. Feminism needs to consider the
"historical, political, and theoretical process" that has created women as the subjects as
well as the objects of knowledge. 34 By historically situating a subject, she is less likely
to mistake herself for the "universal man." Women, who hold a subordinate status in
society, do not have an interest in distorting their perception of reality in order to justify
the injustice of their dominant position, in the way that men do in a male dominated
world. Women, without a need to alter their perception of reality, are therefore more
likely to develop a "clearer and more trustworthy understanding of the world. "35
Standpoint theorists also point to other ways in which our basic perceptions of the
world imply notions of Cartesian thought. The comprehensivness of dualism is even
apparent in the rules of logic. As standpoint theorists point out, even the principles of

34Hartsock, "Foucault on Power," 170-71.
35 Jaggar, Feminist Politics, 384.
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logic divide the world into "A and not-A." The principle of identity (if anything is A it is
A) and the principle of contradiction (nothing can be both A and not-A), both work to
exclude the "middle," that which is neither A nor not-A. These principles, however,
are not representative of the empirical world, where objects are constantly in the process
of transition, growing or decaying, and are very rarely at condition A, or its opposite. 36
This in tum has provided those in possession of the power to define knowledge a way
to define what is A and what is not-A, rational or irrational, human or non-human.
Nancy Hartsock asks, in whose interest is it to maintain these dichotomies ? Only those
who have placed themselves outside of time and space, outside of change. 37 Those
who have defined themselves as A, as rational, as truly human beings.

Justification of Knowledge Claims
The creation of a particular standpoint in which knowledge is legitimated is not a
radically new idea in the history of philosophy. Most feminist standpoint theorists base
their ideas of a privileged female perception of reality in Hegel's consideration of what
can be known about a relationship between a master and slave from the master's point
of view.38 Hegel argues it is in the master's interest to create a false interpretation of the
world in order to legitimize her continued dominance over another human being. It is,
on the other hand, the slave who does not benefit from a social advantage and possesses
an unclouded position from which to view the relationship. Marx and Engel's
developed this insight into the "standpoint of the proletariat," and it is within this
tradition that feminist standpoint theorists developed what they consider the only true
36Nancy Jay, "Gender and Dichotomy," Feminist Studies 7 (1981): 38-56; in Hartsock,
"Foucault on Power," 162-163.
37ttartsock, "Foucault on Power," 163.
38ttarding, "Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology," 53-54; Jaggar, Feminist Politics. 377-383.
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vantage point from which to observe the human condition. This vantage point is not
that of the dominant male position in society, but the standpoint of the subjugated
woman.39
Standpoint theory does not claim a unique position from which to find truth, only
that this position does not depend on a distorted view of the world. This position, free
from illusion, is available to any group which has historically been subjugated or
repressed.40 Although the possibility of an "unmediated" truth is rejected by standpoint
theorists, the notion of truth is not altogether abandoned.41 Standpoint theorists argue
that while dominant social positions result in distorted views of society, those in other
positions in society are able to see through the ideological camouflage and correctly
perceive the world.
Sandra Harding has written an influential account of how the notion of "objectivity"
also remains available to a standpoint theory. 42 For Harding, a feminist standpoint
produces a more adequate, and more unbiased scientific viewpoint which she calls,
"strong objectivity." Strong objectivity requires that the subject of knowledge be located
in the same epistemological context as the objects of knowledge. Further, all of the
objectivity-maximizing procedures which are focused upon the object of observation
must also be focused upon the observers, the scientists and the society which produced
them.43 For Harding, and many standpoint theorists, a "maximally critical study of
scientists" and their communities can only be done by those who have been
39Harding, "Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology," 54.
40 Harding, "Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology," 66-67; and Harding, "The Instability of the
Analytical Categories of Feminist Theory," 29-30

41 Hawkesworth, "Knowers, Knowing, Known," 330.
42 Harding, "Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology,"; and Harding, "The Instability of the
Analytical Categories of Feminist Theory."

43 Harding, "Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology," 69.
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marginalized by such communities. The result of such a critical reflection of objectivity
seeking method requires that scientists and their communities exist in "democraticallyadvancing projects for scientific and epistemological reasons as well as moral and
political ones. "44

Defending a Feminist Standpoint
Standpoint theorists have considered the postmodern critics of epistemology, who
warn that any epistemology eventually leads to exploitation and placing limitations on
thought by legitimizing the beliefs of the powerful. Standpoint feminists, however, feel
that feminism cannot stand with these arguments, and in fact must build on an
epistemology as a defense against both traditional empiricism and relativism.
Traditional objectivism tends towards an incoherent, value-free disinterestedness and a
defense of the status quo. Relativism provides us no foundations to accept feminist
interpretations of sexual, familial, or work relations. 45 Support for the creation of a
feminist standpoint epistemology emerges in light of the importance for feminism as a
political movement to have an epistemology of its own. Only from the standpoint of
women, long oppressed and excluded in this society, is the project of the emancipation
of women likely to succeed. Standpoint theory unites women, as women, on the basis
of their shared experiences in social life, forming a bond between them in their fight
against male domination.

44Ibid., 69.
45 Sandra Harding, "Feminism, Science, and the Anti-Enlightenment Critiques," in
Feminism/Postmodernism, ed. Nicholson (New York: Routledge, 1990), 87-88.
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POSTMODERNISM

Not all feminists, however, are convinced by nor co-opted into the position of the
standpoint epistemologists. Some writers in feminist theory have begun to criticize
what they refer to as earlier "oversimplifications of history," and to move away from
the use of gender as an analytical category. They argue that to write of any "male" or
"female" reality or perspective is to assign a way of being to individuals and to
"homogenize diversity and obscure particularity. "46 To create essential descriptions of
the way women are to act and be opposes the battle which the feminists movement has
long fought for, the ability to be different than the way they are described by the status
quo.
For these authors, feminist theory properly belongs in the realm of postmodern
thought. Feminist critiques of the self, knowledge, and truth are too far divorced from
these concepts of the enlightenment to be compatible with any theory that relies upon
these traditionally oppressive ideas. The future of feminism "cannot lie in reviving or
appropriating Enlightenment concepts of the person or knowledge. "47 Both feminism
and postmodemism attempt to develop new criticisms of social relations not dependent
on traditional philosophical foundations.48

46Bordo, "Gender Skepticism," 143.
47Jane Flax, "Postmodemism and Gender Relations in Feminist Theory," 42.
48Fraser and Nicholson, "Social Criticism without Philosophy," 19.
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Standpoint as Incoherent and Insufficient
The tum to a postmodern feminism begins with an examination of the many
problematic presuppositions of the feminist standpoint claim that a feminist
understanding of the world can be "truer" than previous, male, standpoints.
Postmodemists question why anyone should accept the idea that one group, dominant
or oppressed, has a privileged access to the truth. For postmodemism, there is no
position that is closer to the truth than any other, and every "standpoint" is equally far
from universal truth. Standpoint theory assumes that this oppressed class, unlike the
dominating men, can be free of the determination assigned to them by their participation
in the social system. The notion of a standpoint assumes that the oppressed are not only
undamaged by their oppression, it assumes that this position of submission has given
them a privileged, i.e. more than different, ability to perceive reality.49
Standpoint theory also rests on some essential description of what is female,
although no understanding of this deep identity has been shown to be universally
coherent. There are two traditional approaches to science that have assigned an essential
way of being to women. First, is a biological determinism, which relies upon claims of
a woman's role in reproduction and for a nurturing nature "inherent" in women.
Another has been a cross-cultural examination of male and female spheres of activity,
the public and private realms, as an explanation of why women are generally bound to
the home in social relations. Neither of these, however, is sufficient for understanding
the diversity of forms which gender or sexism can take existing across cultures and
times. Both of these themes were flawed in their attempt to find a single "grand
feature" of human existence that would explain all the features of sexism. As

49Ibid., 56.
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postmodemism denies the existence of these 'large descriptions' of social life, this has
strengthened the call for a postmodern tum in feminism that more adequately explains
the diversity of social existence.
While it may be true that there is a seemingly universal feature of human societies
called "gender," the actual manifestations of this idea are widely diverse and it is simply
not always the case that "difference" equates with "unequal" across social contexts.50
Standpoint theory depends upon a system of gendered social relations in which there is
a category of beings who are fundamentally alike by virtue of their sex, and that an
opposing group is also somehow fundamentally alike in a way different from the first.
Postmodemism rejects the existence of these alleged bonds between individuals, either
across vast cultural differences or within a neighborhood. To postmodemists it is
incoherent to claim, on the one hand, there is a fundamental difference in selfconsciousness between men and women, while on the other hand, claiming that this
self-understanding is basically similar among women and among men, across cultures,
classes, and races. Any similarity claimed to be cross-cultural becomes difficult to
guarantee when given any actual context or example. These essentialist claims serve as
a strong method for developing a bond among women, but they seem deficient in their
representations of differences that exist between women. These differences have
become an increasing concern with the emergence of feminist voices from communities
of differing class and ethnic backgrounds. These differences must be accounted for in
any acceptable feminist epistemology.

50Di Stefano, "Dilemmas of Difference," 64.
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A Postmodern Self
Postmodern feminism rejects the essentialist project of assigning a gender identity
and is critical of any epistemology which assigns a deep sense of self. Postmodernists
reject psychoanalytic claims that an identity is formed in early childhood and remains
constant thereafter. To suggest that self-identities are permanently formed in childhood
suggests that a simple solution to these problems lies in the way we raise our children.
Many feel that feminist critiques of social life are more powerful than implied by the
claim that "allowing boys to play with dolls would be sufficient to bring about equality
between the sexes."51 Essentialists also tend to claim that their deep self-understanding
influences and directs every action that subjects and objects engage in. Arguing that
these identities determine all of one's future actions seems to presuppose an
understanding of a public-private life difference that men and women will lead. Such a
distinction should only be claimed valid for specific, modem, and Western societies, as
there is little cros.s-cultural evidence for this similarity. Such claims play a powerful
role in the writings of Chodorow and Gilligan. Gilligan wrote of "a" voice determining
how women would react in given situations, not that there were a plurality of voices
offering a number of possible resolutions to the moral dilemmas.52
Feminism allied with the methods of postmodemism seeks to avoid any essential
identification of the subject. It must replace unitary notions of "woman" with a more
plural notion of social identity. A notion aware not only of variables of gender, but also
of class, race, age, and ethnicity. Jane Flax argues simply against the existence of a
stable or coherent self and that no human faculty is capable of any form or reason

51 Fraser and Nicholson, "Social Criticism without Philosophy," 30.
52Jbid., 32.
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which allows insight into one's own processes of thought or into "laws of nature. "53
Donna Haraway's influential, enthusiastic support of a postmodern rejection of firm
boundaries for feminism argues for "pleasure in the confusion of boundaries and
responsibilities in their construction. "54 She favors a feminism as a "continuous
cultural reinvention, postmodernist critique, and historical materialism." 55 Haraway
feels that the struggles which have presented themselves to feminists have become too
diverse for any single theory to account for. Claims made by a particular theory about
the characteristics of the category "woman" can be shown to exclude many non-white
women, while a category of "black" can essentialize black women and rule out white
women. There was no singular "she" among women, and only a sea of differences that
leaves us unable to identify similarities or invite allegiance:
"There is nothing about being "female" that naturally binds women.
There is not even such a state as "being" female, itself a highly complex
category constructed in contested sexual scientific discourses and other
social practices. Gender, race, or class consciousness is an achievement
forced on us by the terrible historical experience of the contradictory
social realities of patriarchy, colonialism, racism and capitalism. Who
counts as "us" in my own rhetoric? Which identities are available to
ground such a potent political myth called "us," and what could motivate
enlistment in this collectivity?"56
A postmodern feminist theory must insist that a "natural matrix of unity" is neither
desired nor coherent. 57
Haraway summarizes her own ideas as being built around two themes. The first is
an argument against any universal or comprehensive theory, for these are doomed to
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misrepresent most of reality. Second, her essay revolves around a central character of
the "cyborg" which is to represent and emphasize the need to take responsibility for and
acknowledge the affects of science on social life. This means there can be no creation of
an anti-science metaphysics or a demonetization of technology that surfaces in the
politics of a feminist standpoint. It calls for a "recreation of boundaries," where a partial
connection with others is affirmed as a passage "out of the maze of dualisms" that have
long defined our bodies and ourselves.58
Where the feminist standpoint held aloft the notion of an "other" to oppose the
traditions of subject-object relations, and actively celebrated the irrational and embodied
aspects of the feminine that had been assigned them by sexist philosophy, a postmodern
feminism champions not the theme of "other" but the theme of "difference. "59 Rather
than a reliance upon the singular difference available in gender, a proliferation of
differences is adopted.

Anti-Universalist Nature of Knowled~e
Where standpoint theory argued against a universal conception of knowledge in
order to break knowledge into different "knowledges" for different groups,
postmodemists break knowledge down a step further into different "knowings"
between individuals. This further denies the homogeneity of knowledge, even within
groups, and prefers to hold each individual responsible for their own conceptions of
knowledge. Fraser and Nicholson argue that one of the prime tenants of
postmodemism, one that ought to be shared with feminism, is the strong position it
takes against any meta-narratives.6() Postmodemism would join with feminism to fight
58Jbid., 222-223.
59Di Stefano, "Dilemmas of Difference," 67.
60Fraser and Nicholson, "Social Criticism without Philosophy," 26-30.
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against the "very large social theories" of history, culture, or psychology which claim to
identify causes and features of sexism that operate across contexts and across eras.61
Any theory which makes these types of claims rests fundamentally upon some
assumption about an essential nature of human beings and the conditions of social life
that individuals operate within. For postmodern writers, these "essentialist" theories, of
which standpoint theory is a prime example, are not sufficiently aware of issues of
historical, cultural, and individual diversity which feminists must account for.

Justification of Knowledge
Feminists in favor of a postmodern tum to their project argue there is no force or
reality outside of our social relations and activity that will relieve us of our partiality and
differences. They further argue that the most beneficial path for feminism to follow is
with those who seek to further the decentering of world views. Feminist theory, like
other postmodemisms, can encourage toleration of ambiguity and multiplicity and
work to expose the roots of the need to impose order and structure upon reality no
matter how arbitrary and oppressive these needs may be.62 Rather than be tempted by a
"will to truth" postmodern feminists develop a commitment to plurality and difference.
Feminism should focus on deconstructing paradigms of social understanding which
rely upon traditional philosophical epistemologies, and upon moral and political theory
rooted in partial and historically situated characteristics that are shown as necessary,
universal and ahistoric truths.

61 Ibid., 27.
62p]ax, "Postmodernism and Gender Relations," 56.
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In Support of a Feminist Postmodernism
The advantages of a coalition between these two movements stems from
postmodernism's powerful focus on philosophic criticisms and feminism's primary
concern for political-social issues. Feminism would strengthen postmodernism's
weakness in supporting social activism, and postmodernism will help feminist theory
avoid falling into "foundationalism and essentialism. "63 Fraser and Nicholson argue
that in order to be accommodating to the wide range of social possibilities and
problems, a postmodern feminism would need to be pragmatic in its approach to
identifying bias. 64 It would tailor its methods and categories to fit the specific use that it
is called for at the time. It would include multiple categories when possible in order to
avoid the "metaphysical comfort" of a single feminist epistemology. This diverse and
multifaceted theory would be most useful in its application to political practice.
Feminist politics is seen as an increasing system of alliances, rather than a unified front
around a single interest or identity. Feminist politics would be cognizant that there is no
single solution to the diversity of contemporary oppressions confronting women, child
care, social security, or housing. Rather than argue for a single grand scheme to
represent feminism, there ought instead be an alliance between "many feminisms. "65

63Fraser and Nicholson, "Social Criticism without Philosophy," 20.
64Jbid., 34.
65 Ibid., 34-35.
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ENLIGHTENMENT REVISITED

Recently, however, there has been another tum in feminist theory, arguing that the
project of feminism must remain tied to some understanding of justice if the goal of
emancipation is to be coherently attempted. These writers are currently working toward
a suitable epistemology upon which to base this development in the feminist project.
This "way of knowing" will be enlightened by the penetrating feminist critiques of
mainstream epistemology, building upon the strengths and acknowledging the
weaknesses of previous, if insufficient attempts at a feminist theory of knowledge. This
new theory will have to work carefully through the claims it makes for the deeply
contested notions of "woman" and "rationality," and will need to plan meticulously the
role which the "re-introduced" notion of "justice" will play.
These theorists acknowledge improvements of expanded scientific inquiry initiated
by feminist empiricism but do not find its assumptions consistent with feminist needs.
Empiricism relies heavily upon traditional notions of rationality, which have been used
in the past to exclude women as non-rational. If the notion of rationality is to be
retained, a new understanding of the concept will need to be attempted by these
theorists. A further characteristic of empirical science was its aim toward an objective
knowledge. While this concept has been thoroughly criticized by many feminists,
many theorists are beginning to reconsider its benefits, questioning its hostile rejection
by standpoint theorists and the uselessness attributed to it by the postmodemists.
This group also acknowledges the importance of critiquing the androcentric subject
of knowledge highlighted by standpoint theorists. It has also been important to reexamine the Enlightenment's ideal of a universal knower whose knowledge is
unmediated by environment. Dualism remains rejected by these feminists, and a
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knowledge of human beings must be found that does not rely upon a separation of our
physical existence from our ability to know. But standpoint theories rested upon two
questionable assumptions. First, the notion of a privileged viewpoint from where the
oppressed accurately perceive reality seems incoherent with the rejection of any
universal knower. Second, standpoint epistemologies are unable to overcome the
essentialism that accompanies to the notion of woman, however widely defined. The
distinction of women in general as "different" has legitimated unequal treatment of
women in the past and must be rejected "theoretically and practically" if women are to
be considered in society as the "nondifferentiated" equals of men.66
Postmodemism as well is no longer viewed as pro-feminism. A growing number
of writers highlight the gulf that exists between the tenants of postmodemism and the
values and goals of feminist theory. Postmodemism's rejection of assigned ways of
being avoids essentialism, and denies any privileged vantage point for philosophical
investigation, but upon examination becomes inappropriate for feminist theory in a
number of ways. First, the timing of an allegiance between feminism and
postmodemism seems strange, for why is it that "just at the moment in W estem history
when previously silenced populations have begun to speak for themselves and on behalf
of their subjectivities, that the concept of the subject and the possibility of
discovering/creating a liberating "truth" become suspect?" 67 Postmodemism is
interpreted by these authors as serving the needs of a specific group; white, privileged
men of the industrialized West, who have already had an Enlightenment for themselves
and are now ready to subject that tradition to critique. "Mainstream" postmodemism

66Di Stefano, "Dilemmas of Difference," 67.
67Nancy Hartsock, "Rethinking Modernism: Minority vs. Majority Theories," Cultural Critique
7 (Fall 1987): 187-206; in Di Stefano, "Dilemmas of Difference," 75.
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does not seem any more aware of issues of gender than any of the pro-Enlightenment
theories that it claims to reject. 68

A further, and more damaging weakness in an alliance between postmodernism and
feminism is the difficulty of building any political movement around a postmodern
identity. Feminism seeks actual political and social change from the claims made by the
women's movement. To identify a constituency and to bond them into a motivated
movement, requires some source of shared identity between the movement's members.
Feminism in the past has found this bond in the shared identity of women within the
movement as "women." The postmodern rejection of subject centered inquiry and
theory, and its rejection of labels and identities, does not allow a strong, permanent, or
motivating use of the notion "woman." This seems antithetical to the needs of feminist
theory which revolves around this specific constituency. If specific subjects are unable
to identify with a postmodernist flag, it will be difficult to attract and rally the dedicated
followers necessary for an organized political movement such as feminism. Further,
postmodernism's "robust" celebration of differences, rather than a celebration of shared
identity could be politically unreliable, creating a weakness in the face of the modern
state and uses of power. 69
Christine Di Stefano attributes the dilemma in the search for feminist epistemology
to an inability in any of these three schools of thought to deal adequately with the notion
of difference. In feminist research which remains in the empirical/positivist tradition the
she dissolves into he as gender differences are collapsed into the (masculine) figures of
11

11

the everyman. This sanitized figure remains a central weakness for feminism in the
political claims of liberalism or Marxism. In research from a feminist standpoint, the
68Di Stefano, "Dilemmas of Difference," 75-76. By "mainstream postmodernists" Di Stefano
refers to Derrida, Lyotard, Rorty, and Foucault.
69Di Stefano, "Dilemmas of Difference," 76.
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idea of a differentiated female subject is preserved, but she is preserved at the rather
high cost of denying her transformation or liberation from the conventions of
femininity. Here, radical feminism begins to blur with "new-right anti-feminism,"
which also seeks to discover the correct and proper concept of female, and to celebrate
and encourage this conception in social life. Finally, in a postmodern feminism, the she
dissolves into a dizzying array of differences, none of which is privileged over the other,
leaving no way to determine if the emancipation of women has been realized or not. 70
Thus, finding all three major movements within feminist thought unacceptable,
these more recent writers in feminist epistemology have begun a return to the
Enlightenment, acknowledging that the feminist movement is fundamentally rooted in
the ideals of justice and freedom.7 1 Many authors currently working in feminist theory
continue to identify with the label "feminist," though no longer to indicate a liberating
project for women alone, but rather to indicate a project of emancipation that is
consistent with the goals and discoveries of feminist inquiry into human social life. 72
The feminist movement began rooted in an effort to raise women from the oppression
encountered in a male dominated society. Its goals, however, were never to include the
liberation of women from their commitment to the social relations around them, nor to
liberate humanity from our social existence.
Alcoff and Potter have illustrated the situation that feminists must now be concerned
with as an awareness that, "Each lives at a different node in the web of oppressions. "73
Oppression exists, but so do connections between individuals. Oppression cannot be
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accounted for when considering individuals in isolation, nor by declaring the relations
between individuals universally oppressive. Many of these relations are the factors of
social life which define individuals as who they are, and who they work to remain. An
acceptable feminist epistemology must be able to identify those relations which are
oppressive, and differentiate them from those relations which are the ties that bind us to
our very identities and ways of life.

Community of Subjects
To defend against the radical difference championed by the postmodernists, many
feminists have returned to investigate the connections and commonalties between
individuals. While postmodernism had left feminism in an advantageous position, able
to proclaim the diversity of women and all individuals in general, it also became
"complex and unnerving, inhabiting a constantly shifting ground of emerging and
dissolving differences. "74 Partly in response to the dissolving of knowledge into
individual components, and partly for their need to account for human
interconnectedness, feminists have turned to a communal understanding of knowledge,
so that communities and groups replace the individual as primary in accounting for
knowledge.
In response to the fragmented individuals of empiricism, the emphasis on a partial
humanity in standpoint theories, or the partial representation of humans in
postmodernism, new approaches are being attempted which allow knowledge to
account for complete human individuals and entire human communities. The primary
goal of scientific knowledge, for these authors, should be to represent in a concrete
whole, human lives as experienced by both men and women, the oppressed and the

74oi Stefano, "Dilemmas of Difference," 68.
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oppressors. 75 The epistemology underlying this task is intended to capture what is
human in men and women, rather than to identify the essential characteristics which

separate them.76 Arriving at this knowledge will require a modified conception of
rationality, allowing a new role for experience's interplay with reason. Women's
experience cannot be privileged nor is it static; it is simply a characteristic of historical
existence. Neither experience nor reason, subjectivity nor objectivity, is a prior or more
fundamental component of knowledge.
This argument accounts for both physical and mental characteristics of human
beings, as opposed to empiricism's separation of these aspects. It also opposes
standpoint theory which introduces a new, female perspective upon subject and object
relations which neglects the male perspective and loses the ability to account for all
views. Postmodernism's fragmentation of science into a multiplicity of types and
vantage points is also combined into a unified understanding of human social life. This
knowledge should be able to articulate the inter-relatedness of the parts while respecting
the specificity of differing experiences, providing a narrative of concrete situations, as
experienced by all parties involved.77 The social conditions of any group of oppressed
individuals must be seen in connection with the group from which the oppression
comes. A feminist epistemology must account for the lives of women seen in
conjunction with the lives of men, acknowledging men as both part of the problem and
part of the solution to women's emancipation. An acceptable understanding of

75oshadi Mangena, "Against Fragmentation: the Need for Holism," in Knowin~ the Difference:
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knowledge must include individuals as they wholly exist, and account for the entirety of
their social interactions.

This group of feminist theorists also retains an argument against the commitment to
"epistemological individualism," the assumption that, although other people exist,
knowledge is produced by each individual alone, from one's own senses and
experiences. 78 The argument of a traditional methodological solipsist often assumes the
possibility of private knowledge production, through an individual's own language.
Assumptions about a private language have allowed feminists to turn the insights of
Wittgenstein on these individual knowledge gatherers.79 Here we are reminded that
individuals cannot privately produce language because private communication leaves no
way to distinguish between true statements and those that seem true. Only the
cooperation of two or more individuals can distinguish between how things are and
how they seem. 80 These feminists follow Wittgenstein in arguing that the individual
cannot be epistemically prior to the community, and that the community is composed of
"epistemically interdependent individuals. "81 Knowledge is then primarily a social
construct, and social influences upon knowledge, relations of oppression included, must
be accounted for in a claim to knowledge.
Lynn Hankinson Nelson argues that postmodernism leaves any philosophical
investigation with only two epistemological choices, where on the one hand we are
committed to a Cartesian or essentialist self, or on the other hand, there can be no

78Elizabeth Potter, "Gender and Epistemic Negotiation," in Feminist Epistemoloiies, eds.
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epistemology at all. Nelson argues, however, that this does not exhaust the realm of
possibilities. She feels that this postmodern dichotomy rests on an assumed

individualism. 82 Similarly, postmodemism presents us with the choice between "one
truth" or "multiple truths," and thus claims that there are no truths at all which are prior
to any others. She rejects both the isolated individuals of traditional epistemology, and
also the embedded, but not necessarily social subjects of standpoint theories. In
response to this, Nelson proposes not a "middle ground" between these alternatives, but
a communal account of agency and evidence that abandons the Archimedean points
which base both objectivism and relativism.83
She offers an account of epistemic agency which rests on three assumptions. First,
agents of epistemology have no fixed historic content. Instead it is individuals,
embodied and situated in a specific history who know, where their embodiment and
context are also relevant to their knowing. Second, these agents are not isolated, but
rather strongly related to other features of an epistemology, especially with regard to
evidence for knowledge claims. This account considers evidence to be dynamic,
relating to the new role of active knowers within a feminist epistemology. Finally,
epistemology is understood as "radically interdependent with other knowledge.84
For this change in epistemology to occur, the first item on an agenda of study must
not be the individual knower, but rather an inquiry into how knowledge is generated
within specific histories, social relations, and practices of communities. 85 It is within
these practices that ontologies are developed, criteria for evidence are established, and
82Lynn Hankinson Nelson, "Epistemological Communities," in Feminist Epistemolo~ies, eds.
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theories are made and rejected. The discovery of a piece of scientific evidence is only
possible within a system of practices that exists within a community. Commitments
there are made within particular communities to standards and methods that legitimize
scientific knowledge. Even experience is fundamentally a social notion, interpreted
through the guide provided by society. These communities are simply
epistemologically prior to the individuals that live within them. With these bases for
know ledge established, any notion of a solipsistic knower becomes inconceivable.

Reconsidering Objectivity
Some writers within this category of feminist thought have begun to discuss the
need for feminist theory to return to notions rejected by standpoint and postmodern
writers. Notions such as objectivity and rationality, it is argued, remain too useful in the
construction of a social theory to be completely discarded. But these writers do not
advocate a blind return to the notions as traditionally used, and remain enlightened by
some of the more important claims of previous feminist thought. Important
considerations they make in a return to these notions involve an account for human
social existence and an insistence on the accountability of our knowledge production.86
This justification is important not only to the criteria of other scientists, but also to the
community of feminists.
Writers from this group argue that a careful reconsideration of objectivity ought to be
undertaken, to discover which aspects of it are needed for a feminist project, and which
aspects are rightly discarded. Ismay Barwell writes that there is no necessary reason
why, if part of a concept is rejected, that the entire concept must be forgotten.
Objectivity is at work in two locations within science and philosophy, as a part of its
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methods, and as the goal to be achieved. Rejecting prior methodologies as not
achieving their claim to objectivity is not necessarily followed by the need to reject
objectivity as a goal for science. Objectivity remains a valuable characteristic of a theory
because it indicates an intent to depict phenomena accurately and explain how and why
events occur. This gives objectivity a relationship to "truth" which must be maintained
as a regulatory principle in theories. 87
The value of objectivity and truth for feminist theory lies in feminism's need for
accurate descriptions and analyses concerning social organization which are being
judged according to their justness. Not all of the many varieties of feminism, Barwell
writes, see themselves as radical movements for social upheaval. Instead, feminist
aims are towards the creation of social arrangements more just than those already in
existence. Existing states of affairs need to be judged according to possible states of
affairs. Any creation of a notion of justice will rely upon an accurate description of
states of affairs, which is provided by objectivity. These possible, and more just social
arrangements, need to be created according to some standard. This standard cannot be
recreated each time they come to be considered by another individual.
But this is not to say that traditional concepts will escape without a thorough reexamination. Writers in this group note three aspects of objectivity that need to still be
rejected. First, any claim to a 'God's-eye view' is eliminated, as practically and
philosophically impossible. Second, the idea that objectivity needs a 'complete
justification,' which might provide absolute certainty of scientific knowledge remains
highly questionable. Finally, the notion that there could be any theory completely
devoid of values brought about by the theory's self-understood goals is rejected.

87Jsmay Barwell, "Towards a Defense of Objectivity," in Knowin~ the Difference: Feminist
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Epistemic values such as accuracy, simplicity, or comprehensivness are commonly
constitutive of a theory.88
The challenge remains, for these feminists, as to how to best achieve this ideal.
Ismay Barwell defends objectivity with a reworked notion of Harding's strong
objectivity, while still questioning the primacy Harding gives to the perspective of
oppressed groups. She rejects the traditional dichotomy that knowledge is either guided
by interests or by the facts, in favor of an idea that different groups possess greater or
lesser amounts of the truth, and that the interaction of groups can lead to a greater
number of individuals possessing the truth. She argues that there must be a role given
to a notion of groups as possessing shifting authority in perspective, depending on the
subject, and changing over time. Interacting groups, critical of each other's perspective,
will result in the production of knowledge not specific to one or another of the groups.
With the additional acknowledgment of shifting authority, Barwell hopes to exclude an
over abundance consensus or a lopsidedness of power.89
Allessandra Tanesini agrees with a revisiting of the notions of "rationality" or
"reason" which were rejected by feminists as irreparably sexist and androcentric. 90
This rejection relied upon an assumption about the unchanging nature of words, and
about their use in epistemology. For Tanesini, however, epistemology is not a simple
matter of describing norms or current practices of word usage. Instead, epistemology
should be understood as a practice of advancing and defending proposals on how to
ground our knowledge. Epistemology is a constant process, something which creates
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and recreates norms.91 What was once accepted as imperative does not dictate what
must be the case today. Past use of the idea of rationality or knowledge can be
redefined in terms of what is compatible with today's ideas of these concepts.

Return to Justificatory Strategies
Other feminist authors have used the notion of community to support the need for
legitimizing knowledge claims. Because feminism is an oppositional movement, it will
always challenge authority, unable to embrace the idea that any claim of truth or
legitimacy relies upon some mysterious universalism. 92 For Lovibond, the idea of
morality involves the idea of responsibility, and the ability to account for your actions to
your community of equal fellow citizens. It will not be possible for this community to
be an empirically existing one, but rather a notional one defined in terms of a general
interest.
Fricker proposes a theory of "holism" to form a suitable epistemology for feminism.
This ideal must allow a role for value-laden observation of experience as has been
argued for by many feminists, but must also provide a notion of truth, to avoid the
relativist inability to act upon these claims. The criteria that her empirical account of the
facts must meet are normatively determined, and a historical product. Thus we see the
strong role that norms should play in such a theory, as well as the ability of empirical
criteria to change over time, resulting in a "dialectic" between facts and values.93 This
dialectic eventually becomes a form of self-criticism that will be inherent in the ideal of
91 Ibid., 214.
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knowledge. Thus, Pricker's holism provides an epistemological base for both feminist
deconstructions and reconstructions of Western thought.94
Other authors have addressed the need for a feminist epistemology to account for the
role of norms in the interpretation of experiences.95 There must be an ideal of "truth"
or some criteria for establishing what is "real," transcending situated perspectives as a
regulatory ideal. Any social or political account of know ledge must remain able to
represent and account for the events experienced in the real world. This "realism" is
necessary, especially for a political movement such as feminism, because an
emancipatory epistemology must also seek real change in the events of that world. It is
necessary for an acceptable theory to be able to account for actual events if such a
movement is going to retain the ability to present experiential claims as reasons for or
against certain political views.96
For many, feminism is a political project that requires the feminist claims of
androcentrism and sexism in traditional epistemology and social science to be regarded
as legitimate, and not only legitimate for feminists. For these writers, it thus becomes
problematic to abandon totally the ideas of objectivity and the referential claims of
knowledge. Contemporary feminist writing attempts to create a new form of
rationalism on which a feminist epistemology can be founded. A "feminist knowledge"
is being sought which will remain trustworthy to feminist inquiry. 97 Many of these
writers have returned to the idea of accountability of knowledge, or the justification of
claims of knowing. This new form will need to incorporate the diversity of female
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experiences, forcing it to be able to deal with issues of power and conflict over interests,
and the ability of the self to change in the pursuit of knowledge. 98

FORWARD WITH THE FEMINIST PROJECT

This chapter has explored the developing project to ground feminist political and
social theory in a coherent theory of knowledge. Feminism was followed, beginning in
the claims and arguments of feminist empiricism, through its branching into feminist
standpoint theory and an attempted alliance with postmodernist thought. Each of these
developments was made on a valid critique of the inadequacy of competing theories, as
each school of thought has also continued to critique other positions in defense of its
own. With an understanding of the shortcomings of each of these theories, we have
gained some understanding of where feminist theory might move in its next major
development. Some of the clues to the development were explored in the overview of
feminists who do not consider themselves in any of the available epistemological
camps.
In addition to an understanding of what is rejected by each of these groups, we have
also seen some of the baggage, in the form of requirements, that has been taken on
board the feminist project along the way. In the survey of these many parcels, we have
been able to handle many claims made by feminist theorists, seeing which notions have
been tried and rejected, and which aspects have been tried and found fitting. Those
items which have been cast away from all of these schools of thought must be noted,
and thus avoided in the future. The items remaining on board will have to be
incorporated into the final construction of the feminist project.

98Jbid., 13.
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First, the Cartesian ideal of a dualistic split between mind and body in the
investigation of human social interaction has been thoroughly rejected. All three of the

later groups of feminist writers have demanded an understanding of human
embodiment, and the consequences of context, to be accounted for in a theory of
knowledge. Any idea that some unique, unattached, 'God's-eye view' of human life can
be achieved by human beings, who cannot escape our physical existence, is rejected.

Second, the move that standpoint theory makes towards an essential description of
women ought to be rejected. As many have since argued, these claims seem antithetical
to the original intentions of the feminist movement, to allow women to define
themselves as they see fit, and for them not to be forced to comply with an imposed
way of life. Another characteristic of standpoint theory is the tendency to privilege the
perspective of some group's hold on reality over the perspective of others. While this is
a notion founded upon the strong traditions of Hegel, we still do not have sufficient
reasons why we ought to acknowledge or accept any group's primacy over another.
Third, a feminist epistemology cannot be relativistic. This was seen as the most
important reason for rejecting the alliance with postmodemism. What would become
of the feminist movement if each individual is allowed their own understanding of
correct social relations. On what basis would a feminist project judge one relation over
another as just or unjust? And what basis would there be for rejecting an unjust
situation? Feminism seems in need of some standard of judgment. What was found
lacking in postmodemism, must be demanded of any acceptable theory, the ability to
form a strong political movement on the basis of its claims. Women must be able to
identify with each other as women, and must be able to identify concrete instances in
their experiences to fight against, as well as be able to identify concrete improvement in
social life that they can fight for. This was a central factor in the roots of the feminist
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movement, and will remain so until the creation of a truly just social order is created,
and its maintenance guaranteed.
Therefore, as this paper continues to explore what may develop into a
comprehensive feminist epistemology, we have been able to locate three characteristics
that it must contain. First, this epistemology must acknowledge and account for the
idea that knowledge is contextually derived and dependent. This will involve meeting
feminist demands to account for both embodiment and embeddedness.
Second, this feminist epistemology ought to be capable of accounting for individuals
as distinct individuals, yet as individuals with a history and context. This will demand
that a theory provide a more complex understanding of individuals than is currently
available in any of these three theories.
Third, an epistemology compatible with the emancipation of oppressed groups,
women as well as others, must provide some means of justifying legitimate knowledge
claims. It must be able to show how knowledge comes to be acceptable to a
community and to individuals, and it also must be able to show why this knowledge
deserves this status. In order to meet these demands, this epistemology must provide
some understanding of the idea of justice. As of yet, no single feminist writer has
devised such an understanding of knowledge.
We leave for now our consideration of feminist epistemology in order to explore a
possible source of inspiration for this next stage in feminist thought. After an account
of this approach to political and social life, and the conception of knowledge it is based
upon, we will return in the fourth chapter of this thesis to compare this theory to the
needs of a feminist epistemology explored in this chapter.

CHAPTER III

COMMUNICATIVE SOCIAL SCIENCE

In a separate venue, some distance from the previous chapter's circles of feminist
theory, another writer and another school of thought struggle with many of these same
issues, attempting to build a politically potent philosophical understanding of human
existence and human potential. The critical social science of Jtirgen Habermas is one of
the leading theories that seeks such an understanding of social life, considering both
human social development and contemporary society, while building ideas for an
improved social order in the future. This chapter will begin with an introduction and
explanation of the steps Habermas has taken away from traditional social science's strict
adherence to positivism and purposive rationality. Second, in order to grasp
Habermas's conception of human social life, this chapter will explore the "lifeworld" in
which his social and moral theory is grounded. Finally, this chapter will introduce the
developments Habermas has made in his theories concerning moral and ethical life, and
what these developments mean for human actors in their autonomy and communal
commitments. It is from these three aspects of Habermas's work that this thesis will
propose a path for resolving some of the internal dilemmas of feminist political and
social theory.
Habermas's early writings began to articulate his understanding of human
knowledge, and the consequences this understanding was to have for a science
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attempting to describe social life. 1 In his "philosophical anthropology" he works out
three distinctive characteristics of human understanding that form our basic
"knowledge-constitutive interests." These interests are "knowledge-constitutive"
because they determine what is to count as an object of knowledge, identify what we
accept as relevant for a claim to knowledge, and provide different procedures for
discovering and accepting these claims. 2 The three distinct categories Habermas has
separated our knowledge into are: the technical, the practical, and the emancipatory. In
tum, each of these areas of interest corresponds to a type of science or discipline and an
area of human social activity.
The first, technical interest, is incorporated by the empirical-analytic sciences, and is
associated with the human activity of work. Habermas argues that human work is a
primary level of action, representing ways in which individuals control and manipulate
their natural environment in order to physically preserve themselves. Technical
sciences are intent on a "cosmological" mission of describing the universe in law-like
statements as it is seen to exist. A scientist of these disciplines can and should work
from a disinterested perspective, excluding bias and beliefs from claims of knowledge. 3
Habermas emphasizes that his theory does not attempt to denigrate the empiricalanalytic sciences or knowledge. Rather, he argues that it is incorrect to claim that this is
the only type of knowledge, or that all other knowledge ought be judged by this realm
of technical human interests.
I See Jurgen Habennas's Frankfurt inaugural address of June 1965, titled "Knowledge and
Human Interest: A General Perspective," chap. in Knowled~e and Human Interest, (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1971; original German edition published by Suhrkamp Verlag, 1968), 301-317.

2Richard Berstein, The Restructurin~ of Social and Political Theory, (Philadelphia: University
of Pennsylvania Press, 1976), 191-193. Habermas further argues that these categories are
dependent on the most fundamental needs of the human species for cultural and biological
reproduction. See Habermas, Knowled2e and Human Interest, 196-197.
3Habennas, Knowled~e and Human Interest, 302-311.
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Second, the historical-hermeneutic sciences incorporate the practical interests of
human knowledge, and are associated with interactive human social existence. For
Habermas, social interaction is a "nonreducable type of action requiring a distinctive set
of categories for the description, explanation, and understanding of it. "4 Habermas
argues that individuals shape and determine themselves through this aspect of human
knowledge, not only through their work, but also through communicative interaction
and language. Habermas emphasizes that these interactions are vital for understanding
social and political life. In the historical-hermeneutic sciences the validity of knowledge
claims are not dependent upon a technical control of nature, but instead rely on access to
"the facts" provided by comprehending the meaning of activities, not by observing
them. 5 Hermeneutic knowledge is always mediated, through the initial preunderstanding of an interpreter to the circumstances investigated. Habermas fully
develops the importance and intent of this human interest in his understanding of the
human lifeworld, as will be explored in the second section of this chapter.
A critical science, however, unlike the empirical or the hermeneutic sciences, is not
content with theoretical explanations. Critical science is concerned with going beyond
this type of knowledge to exposing instances when these other sciences become
dependent upon or influenced by ideologies. The methodological framework which
determines the meaning for or the validity of critical propositions is established by the
concept of "self-reflection. "6 Here Habermas stands as part of a philosophical tradition
arguing that "when reason or knowledge is properly understood, we realize that there is
in it a primary interest or demand to become fully actualized. "7 "Reason ... means the
4 Berstein, The Restructurin~ of Social and Political Theory, 195.

5Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interest, 309.
6Jbid., 310.
?Berstein, The RestructurinK" of Social and Political Theory, 198.
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will to reason. "8 The human emancipatory interest seeks to utilize fully the human
capacity of rationality, which Habermas defines more robustly than many have
traditionally done. Additionally, Habermas believes that an "emancipatory interest
cannot be realized by the solitary ego or Absolute Spirit, but only in and through the
concrete social and political lives of men. "9 The results of this belief will be shown
below in the development of Habermas's discourse ethics.
This chapter will explore briefly each of these aspects of Habermas's thought. It
will first touch on Habermas's belief in the need for a deeper understanding of social life
than can be provided by empirical science. Discussion will then move to Habermas's
suggestion for how to understand social life, through an account of the lifeworld, and
the science needed for this understanding. Finally, Habermas's ideas on ethics and
morality will be discussed in relation to this lifeworld, along with the consequences
these ideas have for individual lives, and his understanding of a scientific investigation
of this relationship. With the philosophical developments discussed in this chapter in
mind, the following chapter of this thesis will explore the constructive use to which
feminist theorists can put Habermas's understanding of social life in their own
development of an understanding of human knowledge.

THE SHIFf TO A PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE

One of the central claims to Habermas's work is the inadequacy of a science which
depends exclusively upon empirical-analytic criteria for its claims to knowledge. He
identifies areas where empirical-analytic methods are appropriate, concepts bounded by

8ttabermas, Knowledie and Human Interest, 314.
9Berstein, The Restructurin~ of Social and Political Theory, 198.
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human technical interests, and shows how the empirical-analytic sciences atrophy when
they attempt to step beyond these limits. To demonstrate this inadequacy, Habermas
does not directly attack the claim that these sciences are able to provide us with an
accurate understanding of the world, and instead questions the ability of empirical
science to explain how know ledge is accumulated and transmitted by the scientific
community of inquirers. Habermas shows here that the intelligibility of this
community, "with its distinctive forms of intersubjectivity and communication,
presupposes a level of action-symbolic interaction-and a set of categories needed to
account for that action, which are richer and more inclusive than those explicitly
countenanced by the technical cognitive interests." 10 Thus the intelligibility of these
disciplines, that these scientists are able to communicate with one another, cannot be
fully explained by technical interests, and requires a more comprehensive concept of
socialization and rationality.

Expanding Rationality
In order to develop this "richer and more inclusive" understanding of human
knowledge, Habermas begins with a careful examination of what information is
available to the human capacity for empirical-analytic knowledge. In the empiricalanalytic sciences the logic of inquiry leads to true statements about reality, through the
scientific method, which has proven the best of methods for arriving at valid beliefs,
"beliefs that all future events will not render problematic but rather confirm." 11 Valid
beliefs are universal propositions about reality that can be transformed into technical
recommendations. But this does not yet explain how scientific progress is possible.12
lOJbid., 196.

11 Habermas,

Knowled~e and Human Interest, 119.

121bid., 120-121.
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The logic of experimentation on which scientific knowledge is produced does not
explain how it is that scientists themselves came to the agreement that this knowledge
has universal significance. Before scientists are able to agree on experimentation, there
must have been agreement that has allowed their communication. For this, scientists, as
well as all social actors, rely upon a rational agreement not limited by a technical
interest, an agreement which must be included in our understanding of human
knowledge.
Part of this knowledge can be explained in an expanded concept of rationality, which
Habermas develops by making a fundamental distinction between traditional notions of
instrumental rationality and communicative rationality. Instrumental, or strategic,

rationality is typically defined as the rationality that governs the choice between means
to given (often material) ends. For Habermas, only those who presuppose a set
objective world to act within will limit their definition of rationality to the empirical tests
of truth and efficiency. Contrary to this "realist" view of rationality, Habermas points to
another way of testing the rationality of one's expression, a method which is based upon
the awareness that those actors who behave rationally have presupposed an objective
world to act within. This phenomenological view of rationality accounts for the fact that
the world is interpreted by individuals, and that for a community of individuals living
together, this presupposed world is largely a uniform set of interpretations.
Communicative rationality characterizes the activity of reflecting upon our interpretations

and background assumptions about the world, bringing our basic norms to the fore, to
be occasionally questioned and negotiated.13 Instrumental rationality takes these
background assumptions for granted and concentrates on achievements in the world.

13 Jane Braaten, Habermas's Critical Theory of Society (Albany: State University of New York
Press, 1991 ), 12.
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The abstract, background concept of the world is a necessary condition if
communicatively acting subjects are to be able to reach an understanding among
themselves about events in the world. It is through this communicative practice that
these acting subjects assure themselves of their common life-relations, of an
intersubjectively shared lifeworfd.14
This lifeworld is bounded by the totality of interpretations presupposed, by all
members, as background knowledge upon which all other interactions are founded.15
Habermas further explains this concept as "implicit knowledge that can't be represented
in a finite number of propositions; it is a holistically structured knowledge ... we cannot
make it conscious and place it in doubt as we please."16

In the phenomenological

view, being rational is most closely linked to being meaningful. Here, individuals are
considered to be 'rational' whenever they act on the basis of their lifeworld, i.e., when
they follow a norm established in that lifeworld. These actions are defensible when
challenged, and if an action is criticized the actor can explain the situation in light of
established norms to legitimize the behavior. Further, this phenomenological approach
to rationality allows a theory to account for the rationality of utterances concerning
personal desires or intentions. Criticism of these statements can be defended by
explaining the action as a consequence of one's personal experience or particular
history .17 Thus, phenomenology allows our understanding of the term rational to be

l 41n the Theory of Communicative Action Habermas uses the word "lifeworld" in at least three
different ways. This is the first, and most fundamental to his theory. This "lifeworld" is a
foundational, intersubjective understanding of the world which seems closely related to a
Wittgenstinian concept of a "form of life." For an explanation of his other uses of "lifeworld," refer
to his Theory of Communicative Action, volumes 1 and 2.
l 5Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, 12-13.
l 6Ibid., 336.

17Ibid., 15.
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expanded to include not only (i) assertions about the objective world, but also (ii)
normatively regulated actions, and (iii) expressive self-presentations which are
meaningful and understandable in a context connected to criticizable validity claims.
These three types of communicative action, each being open to criticism, and each able
to be defended with reasons, point to a definition of rationality that is implicit in each of
these areas. Thus for Habermas, "rationality" becomes more broadly defined as being
open to criticism and defensible with reasons.
The rationality of all three of these types of actions are based in the end upon
reasons for their validity. Validity claims are internally connected with reasons and
grounds, found in the meaning of the speech act itself, and not connected to any
additional sanctions. This validation involves giving reasons for the normative
justification of this claim. If a hearer does not take the utterance of a speaker as
immediately justified, the hearer is able to ask the speaker to validate her claims. Then,
discussion ensues concerning the facts, norms, or beliefs that led to the utterance, until
both parties come to an agreement on their validity. This process of coming to an
understanding, and re-establishing a consensus about the interpretation of the world that
was broken by doubting a statement's validity plays a fundamental role in continuing the
lifeworld of the subjects. This process, of giving and responding to reasons for an
utterance, Habermas refers to as "argument." Rationality is therefore firmly tied to the
idea of validity, and depends upon this linguistic give and take of reasons to support its
claim to the title 'rational.'
The lifeworld also refers to one of many "layers" of knowledge. This layer
functions strictly in the background and is absolutely needed by any subject who acts
communicatively .18 All cultural renditions of a lifeworld must be complex enough to

l 8Ibid., 337.
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allow actors to relate to concepts in the objective, social, and subjective realms of human
action if these actors are to be able to behave rationally. With every utterance, any
speaker must be taking up reference to one of these three worlds and orienting her
11

actions towards it. These are more closely understood as one of three actor-world

11

relations:
(i) The objective world represents the totality of all entities about which true
statements are possible. Action towards the objective world presupposes relations
between an actor and a world of existing states of affairs. Action here gives the agent
the ability to form beliefs about the existence of the world through her perception of it,
and further develop intentions to bring about desired states of affairs by choosing
promising means.19 In the objective world a decision is made among courses of
possible action, toward an end, guided by maxims, and based on an interpretation of the
situation. Consideration for this world is often the base of utility and game-theories in
sociology, economics, social psychology.
(ii) The social world represents the totality of all legitimately regulated interpersonal
relations. Action within this world is normatively regulated by "something recognized
as obligatory in the social world supposedly shared by all the members of a
collective. "20 All actors for whom the corresponding norm shares the same force
belong to the same social world. Members can then expect one another, in
corresponding situations, to orient their action to the values held by each of them.
Because an actor is able to take up relations to this world, existing norms motivate to the
degree to which all present value the norm, and to the degree to which different needs
are interpreted through the socializing process. Normatively regulated action is

l 9Jbid., 87.
20Habennas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 2, 120.
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behavior of members of a social group who orient their action to common values, not
about solitary actors who encounter other actors in their environment. In the social
realm, actors comply with a norm, thus fulfilling a generalized expectation of behavior.
This action is not a cognitively predicted behavior, but rather accounts for the normative
sense that others are entitled to expect a behavior. Consideration for this world is often
the base of theories in the study of sociology.
(iii) The subjective world represents the totality of the experiences of the speaker to
which he has privileged access.21 Here an actor engages in dramaturgical action,
presenting a view of himself toward his own subjective world. In this world, desires
and feelings are primary motivations. Desires are oriented towards need satisfaction,
while feelings "perceive" situations in the light of possible need satisfaction.22 Actors
orienting their actions towards the subjective realm purposefully disclose their
subjectivity, and are centrally concerned with a presentation of self Consideration for
this world is often the base of theories in the study of phenomenology.
Each of these areas of action relies to some degree upon a linguistic medium to carry
actor-world relations. In the objective world, language is one of several media through
which speakers attempt to influence others or the world. In the social world, language
is presupposed as the medium which transmits values and consensus. For the
subjective world, language is the medium of self-representation. Habermas's critique of
empirical analytical science and its reliance upon purposive-rational activity has not
rejected its foundations. Instead, he finds the realm of understanding available to
empiricism inadequate for investigating the complexity of human social life, and argues
for the creation of a science that is able to account for the full range of human activities.

21 Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, 100.
221bid., 91-92.
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This science will focus on the foundation of this complexity, human abilities to
communicate linguistically with both a community and themselves. For Habermas,
"The phenomena in need of explication are no longer, in and of themselves,
the knowledge and mastery of an objective nature, but the intersubjectivity of
possible understanding and agreement-at both the interpersonal and
intrapsychic levels. The focus of investigation thereby shifts from cognitiveinstrumental rationality to communicative rationality. And what is
paradigmatic for the latter is not the relation of a solitary subject to
something in the objective world that can be represented and manipulated,
but the intersubjective relation that speaking and acting subjects take up
when they come to an understanding with one another about something. In
doing so, communicative actors move in the medium of a natural language,
draw upon culturally transmitted interpretations, and relate simultaneously to
something in the one objective world, something in their common social
world, and something in each's own subjective world. "23

Leaving Descartes
The three realms of action also play a role in Habermas's understanding of the
evolution of human social life. For Habermas, a correct understanding of the
development of society is as important as a full understanding of rationality. In
developing his theory of communicative action, Habermas argues that contemporary
society must be viewed as the product of a historical evolution, and traces the increasing
complexity of human interaction from tribal organization, through traditional society, to
the organization of modem society today. This transition in social organization is
understood as having accompanied a shift in the norms that govern action, from those
based only in traditions to norms that can be rationally justified.
One of the figures central to Habermas's concern for social evolution is Max Weber
and his theories of social rationalization and secularization. The great influence that
Weber has had on more recent philosophy and sociology is not lost on Habermas, and

23Jbid., 92.
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accordingly he makes a great effort to explain Weber's theories and expose their
weaknesses. Most importantly, Habermas seeks to prove wrong the conclusions
reached by Weber in his interpretation of Western civilization's historical evolution.24
Weber theorized that the development of human societies was represented in the
diffusion of purposive-rational action into social spheres previously governed by
religion or tradition, focusing particularly on the rationalization of the economy and the
state. History has thus brought a general loss of meaning and freedom to human life
through the de-mystification of traditions which once guided much of human
interaction. Habermas argues that this theory is incomplete, as it does not account for,
nor even consider, the concurrent rationalization of the lifeworld that has occurred,
particularly the additional rationalization of the means to reaching a shared
understanding about that lifeworld. 25
Habermas intends to prove that the loss of meaning that Weber envisioned for
human life is neither unavoidable nor a true account of social existence. In order to do
this, Habermas attacks the conception of rationality central to Weber's thinking. For
Weber, it was the strategic-purposive rationality, especially apparent in capitalism's rise
in legitimacy to replace tradition and religious social ordering, that is responsible for the
loss of meaning. It is this conceptualization of reason in purely subject-object terms that
is the fatal flaw in Weber's prognosis. Weber, and all who like him consider human
rationality in only instrumental terms are wrong. 26 Habermas argues that because
Weber could only conceive of rationality in terms of subject-object relations he was

24oavid Rasmussen, Readini Habeunas (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1990), 24.

25 Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, 339-340.
26other classic theories which fall, arguably, with this argument include Hobbesian selfinterest, Hegelian recognition, and Marx's concept of labor. See Rasmussen, Readini Habermas,
25.
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unable to ground rationality in anything other than these relations. For Habermas, this
exposes traditional rationality as merely an ideology. In order to ground rationality in
something other than itself, and to be able to account for the full richness of human
social life, this strict adherence to subject-object rationality must be rejected.
Habermas's theories can be read as an argument against not only this tradition of
purposive-rational dominance, but against all post-Cartesian philosophy of the subject,
or philosophy of consciousness, which was left with the concept of a completely
isolated subject whose relationship to the world can only be understood instrumentally,
and cannot be intersubjectively established. 27 One cannot fully conceive of oneself, or
truly be self-consciousness, if there are only subject-object relations. One must use a
more pragmatic approach to conceptualize the performative, and not only the referential,
use of the expression "I" that allows a self-consciousness. Traditionally, only the
referential aspects of the expression "I" were acknowledged, which neglected the
performative "I's" aspects. It is this performative "I," the "I" as different than and
distinct from others, that promises to save philosophy. 28

THE LIFEWORLD

Habermas's use of Action Theory
An important foundation for much of Habermas's thinking is the use that he makes
of action theory. The theory of communicative action is tightly linked to an action
theory in order to show how our basic moral intuitions are grounded in something

27Rasmussen, ReadinG Habennas, 26.
28ttabennas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, 397.
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deeper and more universal than our particular traditions. 29 In this case, Habermas is
linking our "basic moral intuitions" to a fundamental characteristic of human beings,
our ability to communicate. Habermas uses the term "action" to refer to the symbolic
expressions with which a human actor assumes a relation to an aspect of the
intersubjective lifeworld.30 In this realm, knowledge is guided by a knowledgeconstitutive "practical" interest, an interest that has as its aim not the technical control
and manipulation of the environment, but the understanding of conditions for
communication and intersubjectivity. 31 Members of the human species become
individuals through and within social networks that provide them with a basic
orientation towards the world. In this shared world, individual identities are formed and
maintained. Thus, both the integrity of the individual and the welfare of the community,
equality and solidarity, are accounted for in communicative action. All of these actions
are fundamentally oriented to the human act of linguistic communication, upon which
all of these events depend. To understand communicative action, an actor becomes
involved in the presupposition of a linguistic medium which reflects the actor's relation
to the world.
Habermas argues that there are two forms of action: the strategic and the
communicative. Strategic action is oriented towards achieving success in the world. In
strategic actions actor A seeks to influence the behavior of B through the use of threats,

29Thomas McCarthy, "Kantian Constructivism and Reconstructivism: Rawls and Habermas in
Dialogue," Ethics 105 (October 1994): 47.
30ffabermas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, 96.
31 Habermas clarifies his definition of "action" by emphasizing that "action" does not
specifically refer to bodily movements or physical operations which are performed as a part of an
"action" and includes meaning only secondarily, through being embedded in another action. In
other words, "A bodily movement is an element of an action but not an action." Consider, for
example, the bodily motions involved in playing or teaching. See Theory of Communicative
Action, vol. 1, 96-97.
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sanctions, or rewards in order to cause the interaction to proceed as A intends. On the
other hand, action oriented towards reaching an understanding is called communicative,
and is non-instrumental. In communicative action, speaker A seeks to rationally
motivate hearer B by referring to the binding effect in the implicit guarantee by speaker
A that she will, if necessary, make efforts to validate her claims made in
communicating.32 This communicative action remains "rational" in the sense that a
communicatively achieved agreement has a basis upon which all agree. It cannot be
forced upon or forced by either party.33 Habermas's claim that these communicative
forms of language are primary to strategic types is both fundamental to his theory, and
controversial. 34
In a communicative model of action, language is relevant via the pragmatic use
actors make of it in their orientation to reaching understanding amongst themselves.
Reaching an understanding functions as a mechanism for the coordination of actions. A
basic coordination of actions is essential for actors who share the same social context,
allowing actors to base their actions on the expected reactions of others. Without this
coordination, no actor would be able to predict the responses of other actors to even the
simplest of social actions. Action coordinating is achieved through coming to an
intersubjective agreement about the validity of their utterances amongst themselves.
The theory of communicative action presupposes language as the medium for reaching

3 2 Jtirgen Ha berm as, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, trans. by Christian
Lenhart and Shierry Weber Nicholson (Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press, 1990; original German
edition printed by Suhrkamp Verlag, 1983), 58.
33Habennas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, 287.
34Habennas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. I, 397; and Rasmussen, Readin~
Habermas, 27-28.
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this kind of understanding, in the course of which actors, through relating to the world,
reciprocally raise validity claims amongst each other that can be accepted or rejected. 35
Every process in which action oriented towards reaching an understanding occurs
takes place against the background of this pre-understanding founded within a cultural
context, their lifeworld. When one of these background norms of action is brought to
the fore by participants in order to contest it, the rest of this background remains firm.
There is no way that actors can simultaneously argue over all parts of their
communicative background. This is because in order to understand an utterance, the
interpreter must have a background familiarity with the conditions surrounding its
validity. One must know what conditions do or would make the validity claim
connected to the assertion acceptable. The only context from which the interpreter could
gain this knowledge is from having participated in the communication community
around her. She can understand the meaning of a communicative act only because it is
embedded in contexts of action oriented to reaching understanding. The interpreter has
learned through socialization within that particular culture which conditions validate a
symbolic expression and which do not.
This validity can be claimed in relation towards one of the three aspects of the
lifeworld to which humans orient themselves. Again, these are the objective, the social,
and the subjective aspects of the lifeworld. With each utterance, a speaker is making a
claim that her statement is valid in relation to one of these realms. Each speaker, who
has oriented her actions toward reaching an understanding with the other actors
involved, with each utterance, claims validity in terms of one or more of the following:
(i) Truth. That the statement made is true relative to the existential world.

35Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, 99.

72
(ii) Rightness. That the speech act is right with respect to the normative context
of interaction. (Or that the norm expressed is legitimate.)
(iii) Sincerity. That the manifest intention of the speaker is meant as it is
expressed. 36
To each of these claims made by the speaker, a communicatively competent hearer is
able to accept or reject the claim, responding with a yes or no. As long as this process
continues, and as long as claims to validity are accepted, the lifeworld remains unified
and unproblematic. Eventually, however, a claim will not be redeemed as valid, and a
process of establishing which actor is correct, the norm proposer, or the rejecter, will
ensue. This process is one of serious discourse, and will be elaborated in the final
section.

Autonomy Through Socialization
As one progresses into Habermas's theory it is important to understand the emphasis
the theory of a communicative ethic places on the role of the universal and the
contextual. Habermas often reiterates the importance of the individual's social context
for developing any ideas of individuality or solidarity. He feels that many previous
moral theories have overemphasized the universal, and are thus unable to account for
the specific individuals that make up the real world. On the other hand, strictly concrete
and contextualized theories are not able to offer any conception of morality, which
depends on a non-specific point of view.
Habermas explains how methods typically used to identify the individual are flawed,
and lead to the individual being suppressed by the universal. For example, many

36Jbid., 99.
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theories are able to identify individuals numerically. 37 Here, the individual is
considered as a private concept, and is defined as a deviation away from the universal
features of the social context. On the other hand, some theories attempt to account for
individuality qualitatively. Here, the differentiation of social roles is used as a means to
increase individualization. In other words, the greater the number of social roles that are
available for an individual to choose from, the more unique each person's combination
of roles can be. In both of these cases however, the universal characterization
overshadows any uniqueness. If each is uniquely individual, there is no comparison to
allow differentiation. Qualitative methods also seem flawed as there is no reason to
believe that having an increasing number of social roles to choose from increases
autonomy. Habermas criticizes these theories that identify the individual "ironically as
the nonidentical. "38
Habermas argues instead for a concept of individualization that allows us to
understand autonomy, and the capacity to be one's self. It should allow us to
distinguish between two phenomena: (i) social differentiation, and (ii) progressive
individualization. We can arrive at this type of an understanding by revisiting Cartesian
dualism. This subject-object model of consciousness is sufficient only for
understanding the ego as knowing consciousness as an object, i.e. the conscience is
conceived of as an "it." In contrast, Habermas uses a view of the "practical self' to
demonstrate his understanding of individualization. He begins the explanation of this
self with the writings of Mead. Mead retains the dualistic ideal of a self-reflecting upon
itself as an object. In this rendering, however, the object is not found from the third37Jilrgen Habermas, Postmetaphysical Ihinkin~: Philosophical Essays, trans. William Mark
Hohengarten (Cambridge MA: The MIT Press, 1992; original German edition published by
Suhrkamp Verlag, 1988), xii.
38Habermas, Postmetaphysical Thinking, 157.
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person perspective, but rather from a second-person perspective as a participant in a
communicative context: where the other is an alter-ego. The self then conceives of itself
as the "alter" of this alter-ego. Mead explains this as when an organism first takes up a
relationship to itself, and is thus first constituted as a subject, in the moment when
communicative relations are established between organisms. Subjectivity and
intersubjectivity are thus coeval.
This new self-understanding is constituted of two parts:
(i) the theoretical "me," or I which is a person's consciousness of her "self'; and
(ii) the practical "me," (alter) which is the agency through which she monitors her
behavior.
For Habermas's theory of individualization, it is the practical me that is of interest here.
This "me" (alter) comes into existence as the subject establishes a practical relation to
herself by adopting a normative attitude of an alter ego toward her own behavior (which
is the "I"). In later development this me (alter) expands to encompass the generalized
expectations of all members of society, thus becoming the attitude of the generalized
other. Thus a self identity which is constituted solely in this "practical me" would be
totally conventional in character (reflecting only the generalized norms of society). For
Habermas. the "I" of presocial impulses does battle with the "me" of convention,
constrained by social norms.
This points to a critical potential embedded in this understanding of the selfs
development. The suppression of the "I" indicates that the identity of the individual is
not a true one, and remains to be emancipated from this internal suppression. The
releasing of this "I" is a precondition for the emergence of a post-conventional self
capable of moral reasoning. At the conventional (strictly norm-governed and not yet
individualized) stage of reasoning the "I" is suppressed by the "me." In the
development to a postconventional level of reasoning, the priority of the I and me will
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become reversed, the I will project a new intersubjective context, that of a wider,
universal community. It is the selfs relation to a universal community which will
make the achievement of true self-knowledge possible. To realize one's true identity the
self cannot remove itself from this community. Instead, in order to develop to the postconventional level of moral consciousness, it is necessary that the individual take up a
critical attitude to the merely given norms of the particular community
Individualization then, is not equal to social differentiation, nor to an increasing
number of social roles. Habermas does, however, see the increase in societal
differentiation as necessary. This process leads to the disintegration of conventional
reasoning via a breakdown of the conventional individual's ability to reconcile the new,
large number of social roles. This breakdown becomes emancipatory, allowing the
individual to escape from the traditional confines and norms of her community, though
in the process losing herself (her meaning). It then becomes possible for the self to
project the regenerated, universal community with which she can reason, thus finding a
true self-identity and a moral ideal.
To show why this does not again triumph the universal over the individual,
Habermas argues that a balance is struck between the "moral self-determination" and
the "ethical self-realization." First, moral self-determination transcends the specific
context to a universal normative consensus. But this does not imply the leveling of
differences. It implies the abstraction of universalized norms, which become more
compatible with concrete diversity, and more tolerant of different, tolerant, forms of life.
Second, through ethical self-realization actors appeal to the projected universal
community, not for agreement, but for recognition of her claim to authenticity. When
making any claim, I also claim my individuality. Even rejection of these claims is
confirmation of "me," of the selfs claim to identity. Hence, communication between
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individuals does not clean away differences between individuals, it confirms, and is
necessary for that difference.

Communicative Action
We have seen how human actions regulated by norms, expressive self-presentations
and evaluative expressions, combine with speech acts to form a communicative
community. This practice, which must be conceived of in its entirety, forms the
lifeworld for acting human subjects, and provides the foundation for all of their actions
and orientations to the world. Operating within their lifeworld, actors use this
communicative community of criticizable validity claims to achieve, sustain, and renew
their identities and individuality as well as a consensus about their interpretation of the
world. An important premise of this theory is that language, as communicative
discourse, is both emancipatory in the ways we have seen, and even more
fundamentally, has a priority over other forms of linguistic usage in certain forms.
Habermas has made this claim based upon the nature of discourse rather than from any
particular reading of political theory. This claim rests upon the scientific/empirical
assertion about the nature of language (i.e., its acting as a foundation for all social
interaction), thus freeing the theory from any claim of epistemology.39 Habermas is not
arguing that communicative forms of language ought to be primary, but arguing that
they are primary. "Reason does not need to be regenerated, it is by nature regenerative
in the sense that reason as communicative reason is embedded in language. "40 This
stems from language's original use as an instrument oriented to reaching understanding,

39Rasmussen, Readin~ Habermas, 18.
40Rasmussen, Readint: Habermas, 28; See Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol.
I, 288-292.
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rather than oriented to achieving success. Communicative actions are foundational, and
can not be reduced further to teleological terms.
Embedded within the practice of coming to a consensus about the lifeworld, there is
a fundamental practice that can be seen as "rational." This understanding of rationality
is not strictly tied to tests of truth or efficacy about means to a desired end. Instead, a
richer understanding of rationality extends to include actions that are meaningful, and
can be supported by reasons. Thus, we must be clear about the role of reasons in
communicative action. We say that in each speech act an actor makes a claim to validity
in one of the three realms of action: objective, social, or subjective, and must be
prepared to support that claim with reasons if called upon to do so. An individual "only
understands reasons to the extent that one can understand why they are or are not
sound." This knowledge comes to a hearer by applying his "own standards of
judgment," or "standards that he has made his own." 4 1 These reasons are responded to
with either a yes or a no, which indicates the hearer's acceptance or denial of the validity
of the reason. Since all rational actions must be able to be criticized, all rational actions
are supported with claims to validity.
The subjects of a communicative community are able to operate normally, in
everyday communication, as long as the consensus of norms is continued. This is the
case when speaker A makes an assertion x, to which a hearer B responds by rejecting
the validity of x with criticism y. In support of her assertion x, A then offers a reason z
in support of her assertion. To this reason, B applies his powers of judgment and
responds with a "yes" or "no" to that reason. If the reason is accepted, consensus is reestablished and communication continues as usual. If however, B rejects the validity of
reason

41

z in support of assertion x, then the communicative consensus has broken down

Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, 116.
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and must be repaired. For this repair an argument must ensue between A and B, an
argument free from force, and based only on the rational acceptance of reasons to
rebuild consensus, ensuring the further, proper functioning of the lifeworld. For this
reason, Habermas believes, "that the concept of communicative rationality, which refers
to an unclarified systematic interconnection of universal validity claims, can be
adequately explicated only in terms of a theory of argumentation. "42 Argumentation,
then, must be further explored. This theory next turns from normal, everyday
communicative action that occurs between individuals in a lifeworld, to seek an
understanding of the discourse that emerges between individuals when a breakdown in
this shared world occurs. This type of serious discourse is the argumentation that will
repair breakdowns in the lifeworld. Habermas's understanding of the rules of these
arguments will be explored in the next section, the theory of Discourse Ethics.

THE UNIVERSAL

Before beginning this section, a possible misunderstanding within Habermas's
theory of discourse ethics should be clarified. In this section, an argument will continue
to be built upon the idea of a community based upon an intersubjectively shared preunderstanding of the world, communicating with itself about the regulation of social
actions. Linguistic communication between individuals leads to the grounding of
universal principles. These universal principles are the only principles that Habermas
intends to refer to as "morals." Guides to social action that are context and group
specific, and not universally valid, are to be called "ethics." Habermas is not centrally
concerned with grounding, explaining, or justifying these ethical principles. He is

42 Ibid., 18.
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concerned with and focused upon the grounding and foundation of morals, morals
which posses validity across contextual situations, and are understood as universal.
Thus his theory would be better labeled "Discourse Morality," or a "Discourse Theory
of Morality." The title "Discourse Ethics," however, has been affixed to his theory, and
thus he, as well as all other authors, continue with the original wording.43 Thus, in what
follows, the ethical is what relates to the contextual and the moral refers to the universal,
except references to "discourse ethics," which is intended to be universal.
In his theory of discourse ethics, Habermas has set out to champion the project of
modernity against anti-enlightenment critiques, talcing direct aim at claims that "the
Enlightenment's project of establishing a secularized morality free of metaphysical and
religious assumptions has failed. "44 By rejecting these claims, he also attempts to
unravel the paradox of modernity. Habermas hopes to understand, in less dire terms,
the loss of meaning that has accompanied modernity's turn away from the tradition and
religion that once ordered so much of human interaction. In order to support these
arguments he developed two complementary theses, one of society based on the
rationalization of institutions and interaction, and another of rationality grounded in
linguistic communication. It is through these two theses that Habermas finds an
understanding of rationality that allows insight into the moral.
Using the Kantian tradition as a point of departure, his theory of discourse ethics
seeks to defend the primacy of justice over the good. Habermas argues that we must
separate questions of ethics, which give us information about the pursuit of certain ends
given our preferences, from questions of morality proper which provide us with insight

43McCarthy, "Kantian Constructivism and Reconstructivism," note 7; and Jiirgen Habermas,
Justification and Application, trans. Ciaran P. Cronin (Cambridge MA: The MIT Press, 1993;
Original German edition published by Suhrkamp Verlag, 1990 and 1991), 2.
44ttabermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 43.
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about justice and a fair and impartial consideration of competing claims. He seeks to
provide an understanding of morality that is universally valid, and not dependent on
ethical concerns for the good life. Habermas, however, departs significantly from
Kantian thought by arguing against the role of solitary reflection. With Habermas, both
consciousness and thought are seen as structured by language, and as such are social
aspects of humanity. The subject, in considering issues of morality, must be seen in the
context of communication, where meaning and individual identity are communally
determined.
If it has not already been made apparent, it should be made clear now that

Habermas's theoretical construction of the moral does not attempt to avoid a serious
consideration of modern pluralism. While the diversity of claims to validity in modem
times may rule out the idea of philosophy providing a universal answer to the question,
"How should I (we) live?" Habermas does not believe that this denies the possibility of
a "narrower" sort of theory, specifically, a theory of justice. 45 Discourse ethics seeks to
understand the moral point of view from which questions of right are fairly and
impartially judged. This point of view will be characterized by its impartiality amongst
claims and acceptability to all concerned with these claims. This will at last arrive at the
procedure that Habermas envisions for the community of moral subjects engaged in a
dialogue of practical argumentation aimed at reaching a rational agreement between the
actors involved in the cultural context in question.
In the exploration of discourse ethics, the consequences a linguistically founded
theory of consciousness have for an understanding of human interaction will be seen.
After Habermas's understanding of meaning and validity are seen to be based on
linguistic agreement, the possibility of universal agreement on certain aspects of action

45McCarthy, "Kantian Constructivism and Reconstructivism," 46.
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will be grounded. This will allow an understanding of discourse ethics to show how
human beings can be capable of agreeing upon principles to guide our actions in the
world, a concept of morality which can be shared across lines of tradition and
community.
Understanding the power that normative validity holds in a moral theory of
communicative action, Habermas argues that meaning is given to actions by the
communicative community, rather than by a solitary thinker. Even the concept of truth,
so central to many philosophies of consciousness (as leading to a God-like knowledge
of the cosmos), is displaced by what is acknowledged as valid by all in communication.
Finally, rationality as well was found in terms of communication rather than a mode or
style of solitary thought. The next section shows, in discussing meaning, truth, and
rationality, a dependence upon 'what has been accepted by the communicative
community,' or what has been accepted as 'valid' by the community. In the final
sections we will see how Habermas describes and empowers the idea of validity, and
how through this idea he is able to ground his universal moral principle.

Meaning. Truth. and Rationality Through Consensus
To begin the move towards discourse ethics, Habermas's ideas concerning meaning
and truth must be grounded in the idea of a lifeworld, as the foundational background
agreement between all subjects in a communicative community. In this community, we
must understand how mutual understanding between speakers is possible.46 The
answer for Habermas stems from an idea of communicative competence, which all
capable of speech in a community possess concerning the shared knowledge of the
norms of communicative rationality. The most basic of these shared norms is that the

46Braaten, Habermas's Critical Theory of Society, 19.
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use of language to reach an understanding between actors is the original mode of
language use. 47 Because there is a fundamental motivation amongst the participants in
communication to work for and accept a consensus, this is never a mere "agreement for
the sake of agreement." It is a necessary aspect of communicative ability.
Habermas argues that linguistic meaning must be understood in communicative
terms. Every utterance depends upon two characteristics of communication for its
meaning. First, every utterance implies or states a propositional component p that
predicates something of an object. The second, and equally important aspect of an
utterance is how this propositional content is put forth. The force of the utterance is
given to it by its illocutionary component. This component may or may not be made
explicit by a performative clause such as: "I assert ... ," "I command .... " Even without
such a stated claim, an utterance may make a promise, a promise to support the
statement with reasons.48 For Habermas, communicative actions are only those in
which all participants pursue only illocutionary intentions, which establishes that the
speaker is performing some action with her speech, and work to mediate acts of
communication. In fact, however, this illocutionary component of the speech act is only
one of the three distinct validity claims that each utterance makes. With her utterance,
the speaker makes a truth claim relating to the objective world, she claims the rightness
of her assertion regarding the social world of normatively regulated interactions, and
claims the truthfulness of the statement relating to the subjective world of experiences to
which only the speaker has access. The meaning of a statement is thus tied to
conditions of its validity.

47Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, 287-288.
48 Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. I, 288; and Theory of Communicative
Action vol. 2, 89.
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Further, each of these claims is universal in two senses. First, each of these claims
is itself a universal formal feature of linguistic communication. Rational
communication is not possible without making one of these claims. Second, each also
claims to be universally defensible for its claims to truth, rightness, and sincerity. In
other words, a claim to validity points implicitly to a procedure of argument, of the
giving and taking of reasons, that could be given in support of the validity claim.

49

In

discourse ethics the idea of the world is no longer understood through a monological
consciousness, but rather through interacting subjects who make validity claims
amongst themselves. Meaning must be viewed pragmatically in terms of the
acceptability conditions of utterances raised to claim validity.
From this conception of meaning, Habermas understands the idea of truth in a
language community as a social one. For example, the difference between knowledge
and ignorance is not made in order to clarify statements from the perspective of a
disembodied ideal observer.50 Instead, the difference must be understood from the
view of the human community engaged in communication. It is a basic need of this
group to achieve and maintain a solidarity based upon mutual and rational agreement
about how the world is. An agreement about these ideas for an entity beyond this
community would have no purpose for them, would be meaningless, and not sought. 51
Thus, anyone fully capable of communicating in a community has at least an implicit
understanding of what is meant by 'truth.' This is because every speaker is aware that
they can be held accountable for presenting a statement as true, that they could be called
upon to produce reasons why the utterance ought to be accepted. Truth must be
49ttabennas, Postmeta,physical Thinkin~, ix-x.
50Braaten, Haberrna,s's Critical Theory of Society, 22.
51 See Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, 279-286 on the purpose of validity
claims.
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understood as one of many rationally criticizable validity claims. For all actors who
communicate in this way, 'truth' is that which can be agreed upon as the rational
consensus of all thus engaged.
This illustrates the emphasis that Habermas makes between his pragmatic theory of
truth, and other, semantic theories of truth. Truth for Habermas must be tied to its
communicative purposes, rather than some form of 'metalanguage' seeking an absolute
know ledge. This understanding of truth arises through an understanding of the way
"truth" is used in communication. The phrase, "xis true," is used to support the idea of
justifiability of a statement in a discussion. It does not supposes some god-like ability
to know the state of the cosmos. Thus the concept of truth stems purely from its
purpose in maintaining a communicative competence between subjects.52

If truth is understood as a type of validity claim, we must further clarify what it
means to r.laim that an agreement is rational. Habermas argues that we generally
evaluate validity claims not by directly comparing a statement with a state of affairs in
the objective world, but by examining the reasons that a speaker can give to support
what she has said. As above, to claim that one's statement is valid, is to claim that good
reasons could potentially be given in support of it. These reasons are evaluated on their
intersubjective acceptability. To be rational, it is important that these arguments be
decided through the force of the better argument alone, and not influenced by any power
relations between the participants. Habermas describes certain conditions that speakers
must feel are met before they are confident that an agreement was reached based on
reasons alone. These conditions form a basic structure of argumentative speech that

52Braaten, Habermas's Critical Theory of Society, 22-23.
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creates a general symmetry between participants. Haberrnas has referred to these
conditions as an ideal speech situation.53
Originally this ideal speech situation was used as a way to describe the conditions of
an argument that would have to be met in order to be able to call the outcome of that
argument rational. These conditions were meant to show how the agreement, could, in
the end, be based only on reasons and the power of the better argument. The conditions
of the ideal speech situation are summarized in three main points:
(i) That the argument is open to all competent communicators. (Potential
Participants)
(ii) That everyone is free to question any assertion. (Equal Opportunity)

(iii) That all are free from any internal or external coercion. (Repression Free)
Habermas emphasizes that this "ideal" speech situation should not be misunderstood as
a condition that must be achieved in actual social life. 54 The criteria in the ideal speech
situation should not be considered as constitutive rules of discourse in the sense in
which chess rules are constitutive of a real chess game. While the rules of a chess game
"determine the playing of the actual chess game, discourse rules are merely the form in
which we present the implicitly adopted and intuitively known pragmatic
presuppositions for a special type of speech.... "55 The ideal is to refer to its "regulative
functions." It is also emphasized that the participants need only feel that the conditions
of this ideal speech situation are met to a sufficient degree. When this is the case, then it
is correct to say that the participants were rationally motivated to agree with a speaker,
and communicative consensus will again maintain prominence. Habermas argues that
53see Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 88; and Theory of
Communicative Action, vol. I :25.
54ttabermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 91-93.
551bid., 91.
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the ideal speech situation is an "inescapable presupposition" of argumentative speech,
and should not be interpreted as a simple contextual convention. 56

The Principle of Universalization
What concerns Habermas at the outset of grounding a principle of universalization is
to show how agreement is at all possible among diverse individuals in a communicative
context. Thus, before he seeks to explain how individual norms are to be evaluated by a
group to determine their validity, he explains how agreement between diverse actors is
even theoretically possible. His principle of universalization (U) will show that
agreement is possible in moral argument "whenever matters of concern to all are open
to regulation in the equal interest of everyone. "57
To begin, in Habermas's theory of normative acceptance, ethical norms do not claim
to be true or false, but rather claim to be valid or invalid. Normative claims are
understood as different from, but in some ways analogous to truth claims. Truth claims
are descriptive statements which show concern for the external, existing state of affairs.
While normative validity claims concern what are intersubjectively recognized as
"legitimately ordered interpersonal relations. The truth of a proposition signifies the

existence of states of affairs in much the same way as the rightness of actions signifies
the observance of norms."58 In statements about normative validity, we can see
reflected a dependence of language upon the social world, one which is not true for
instance between language and the objective world. While there is an "unequivocal
relation" between existing states of the world and statements about it, the existence of a

561bid., 89.
571bid., 66.
5 8 Ibid., 59-60.
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social norm does not guarantee its validity. Therefore, we must distinguish between
"the social fact that a norm is intersubjectively recognized and its worthiness to be
recognized. "59
For a norm to be deserving of the status 'valid' we must be able to say that there are
good reasons for it being so. Obviously then, with the assertion of a claim to validity,
there is an implicit guarantee to support it with reasons. Indeed, it is the case that one
"ought" to provide these reasons when questioned about how a moral judgment was
arrived at. While this is true of normative judgments, the same is not true of statements
about a worldly state of affairs. There is no concept of "ought-to-be-justified" tied to
judgments about the world. Habermas feels that when questioned about how we make
empirical judgments about the world, we present reasons based in epistemologies and
the philosophy of science. When, on the other hand, we are asked what makes moral
judgment possible, we immediately proceed to describe our ability to adjudicate
normative claims, or our "logic of practical discourse. "60
For Habermas, this logic of practical discourse is based upon a fundamental
assumption that is shared universally when actors engage in argumentation over
normative claims to validity. This means that actors must implicitly accept the rules
discussed in the ideal speech situation, as well as implicitly acknowledging the
possibility of agreement between actors. Habermas expresses this necessary condition
for discursive argumentation as:
(U) All affected can freely accept the consequences and the side effects that
the general observance of a controversial norm can be expected to have for
the satisfaction of the interests of each individual.61
59Jbid., 61.
60Jbid., 62.
61 Ibid., 93.
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Habennas explains this as a bridging principle which, as a presupposition of
argumentation, makes agreement in practical discourses possible whenever matters of
concern to everyone are open to regulation in the equal interest of everyone. The
principle of universalization insists that all affected must freely agree that the
consequences of a norm satisfy the interests of each individual. Being a moral
principle, it is meant to reflect the "general intuition" that true or valid statements are not
only valid for the single actor, but for all that may be affected.62
Before leaving discussion of the principle of universalization, it is important to
clarify its role in communicative action. (U) is a moral principle, and the only moral
principle in Habermas's theory. It is not a rule of logical argumentation, nor is it a
substantive principle of participation, nor a basic norm. If (U) were conceived of as a
rule or a norm which is produced within a cultural tradition, it would itself require
justification. This is not the case. (U) is necessary for the process of argumentation to
occur and to be resolvable at all. If (U) were not in principle possible (i.e., if no
agreement was even conceivable), no actors would enter the discourse. As a
presupposition of argument, (U) shows us what it means to have achieved agreement in
the moral argument. Every argument, occurring in any context, is based upon the
pragmatic presupposition "from whose propositional content the principle of
universalization can be derived. "63 The principle of universalization justifies the
existence of moral argumentation at all.

62 Habermas, Justification and Application, 52.

63 Habermas, Mora] Consciousness and Communicative Action, 82.

89

Discourse Ethics
Leaving the justification for moral argumentation via the principle of universalization
(U), we move to consideration of the actual discourse that actors go through in moral
argumentation. While nearly all philosophies have expressed an idea of the importance
of impartiality in moral judgments, those that rely upon teleological reasoning are not
sufficient for determining validity. Teleological reasoning can only provide information
about the consequences of situations: (i) where all persons followed the norm or, (ii) if
all persons acting in an identical position followed the norm. These perspectives,
however, are not able to account for all possible points of view. For example, (i)
excludes the consequences of this norm from the viewpoint of different individuals;
while (ii) denies the concrete differences among discrete individuals. Habermas, on the
other hand, asserts that "true impartiality pertains only to that standpoint from which
one can generalize precisely those norms that can count on universal assent because
they perceptibly embody an interest common to all affected. "64 This is a reflection of
the intuition that valid norms deserve recognition by all concerned. Thus in order to
make moral judgments from a truly impartial point of view, each must consider the
perspectives of all persons who will be affected by the norms.
Within discourse ethics, Habermas moves from a principle thatjustifies the practice
of moral argumentation (U), to a principle used in application, in deciding which of the
contested norms that have been brought to the discourse are in fact worthy of being
called ethical norms. This principle of application is what Habermas has called
discourse ethics (D), and provides the actual criteria that must be met by a proposed
norm to be claimed valid. The idea of an ethics of discourse is reflected in the principle:

64Ibid., 65.
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(D) Only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with
the approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical

discourse. 65

Discourse ethics states the basic idea of a moral theory, but is not a part of the logic of
argumentation. This principle presupposes that we can justify the norm we have chosen
to consider, but this assumption was justified by the discussion of the principle of
universalization. 66 Individuals, who were shown capable of (U), must engage in an
actual discourse to validate a norm. This discourse will be concluded when (D) has
been achieved.
The principle of discourse ethics (D), is a guide to a procedure, that procedure of the
"discursive redemption of normative claims to validity. "67 This practical discourse is
not a method for the production of justified norms, but rather a procedure which will
allow the testing of the validity of the norms that have been proposed to the community
in discourse to debate over. This shows how this discourse is dependent upon the
context of the community to bring contending norms before it to be decided upon. This
discourse is also always connected to a concrete point in the lifeworld where there has
been a breakdown in consensus. Thus, while the procedure is quite formal (in the
Kantian sense) it depends upon and deals exclusively with, concrete norms.
It is within this procedure of discourse that needs of mere individuals will be
discarded for needs of the community as a whole. When norms are questioned, the
norm is defended with casuistic evidence about the consequences and side effects of

65Jbid., 93.
66Jbid., 66.
6 7 Ibid., I 03.
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applying the norm for the fulfillment of accepted needs. 68 This limitation to accepted
needs shows that needs are not taken at "face value" but are first interpreted through
critical reflection in discourse. For Habermas, an individual's experiences and interests
are not satisfactory bases for the validity of a claim. These personal claims are
subjected to the criticism and reflection of the community, thus "transcended and made
to be intersubjective."69 In this way, personal experiences (and needs) are brought out
of the private and into, and thus part of, the world that the communicative community
shares. Interests which are anti-social are found to not be generalizable, because of
being based on needs which deny more basic and general interests. 70 This gives rise to
what Habermas refers to as "discursive will formation."
Discursive will formation, which leads to the discovery of genuinely generalizable
interests, happens within an interactive process that Habermas refers to as need
interpretation. Habermas shows how individuals know that they have needs, and
shows how others are convinced that others have these needs. The only needs and
interests relevant to ethical norms are those which are universal or generalizable. An
ethical norm could only be universally valid if it is based in these, common, universal
interests. A norm cannot be universal if only some of the group's interests are
represented. What Habermas refers to as generalizable interests belong to a very
specific group of interests, interests that are discovered in the context of "general will."
For Habermas, these interests are those that we can only find as social beings, and only
through a "reflective dialogue." This is what some authors feel is one of the more

681bid., 65.
69Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 67-68; Braaten, Habermas's
Critical Theory of Society, 31-32.
70Braaten, Habenuas's Critical Theory of Society, 32; Moral Consciousness and
Communicative Action, 67.
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important and unique features of Habermas's Discourse Ethics, the way in which he
feels that genuine and generalized interests are formed.71
It is the process of ideal role taking, and producing a general will that returns to
support the "action-coordinating function that normative validity plays" in the lifeworld.
Moral arguments are not solved by isolated individuals, but are only solved in
cooperation with other actors. It is necessary that in these moral matters the common
will of the community be expressed, and not the judgment of a single person. For this
reason a "real" argument is needed in which participants are those real individuals
concerned with the outcome of the debate. It is only this real argument, consensually
solved, that can give participants in the communication community the knowledge that
"they have collectively been convinced of something. "72
The basic norms that will be represented in contextual law and morality are
substantive principles to be justified within practical discourse and fall outside the realm
of what moral theory alone can produce. Historical eras change, and each community's
lifeworld will generate its own ethical ideals. It is these discourses which give rise to
the ethical principles and make use of substantive normative rules of argumentation.73
It is these rules alone that a theory of moral argumentation is able to produce. Each
specific context produces norms to bring into the arena of discourse where they will be
judged valid or rejected.
Finally, Habermas is not arguing that all norms must be shown as universally valid.
There are many areas of social interaction that do not depend on universal norms, and
yet posses norms for that group. Examples of these are rules of etiquette or tactfulness,
the expectations of family members, and the standards found within private, voluntary

72Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. 67.
7 3 Ibid., 86.
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associations. Habermas distinguishes these non-universal norms from the universal by
the method with which they achieve validity. These non-ethical norms need only prove
valid for a consensus of that group, and no further. 74 It is important that these
generalizable interests be discoverable, as otherwise all the norms validated will only
seem valid in the context of that communication community. 75 Those norms that are
specific to a community should be seen as candidates for universal norms, but only for
that context until they are put to a test of universalizability. These contextualized norms
are where Habermas finds concerns for the "good life." Most of these will be required
to stay there, in context, and unacceptable to universalization. 76

SCIENTIFIC, PRACTICAL, AND CRITICAL

Habermas has followed the development of human societies from pre-modem
groups that relied upon God or fate to settle debatable issues to contemporary
civilizations with highly complex methods of dispute resolution. The secularization
and rationalization of society that Habermas shows in this process, however, have left
us with no way to establish normative rightness or propositional truth except through
the medium of rational argumentation. Through this development, "normatively"
secured agreements are replaced by agreements that have been communicatively
achieved, which are the only agreements considered to be acceptable or legitimate. In
other words, as the older sources of legitimacy (God) have lost their authority, social
actors have had to increasingly rely upon their own resources. To do so, human beings
74Braaten, Habeonas's Critical Theory of Society, 33; Habermas, Moral Consciousness and
Communicative Action, 104.
75 Habennas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 104.
76Braaten, Habennas's Critical Theory of Society, 35.
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have reached agreements based upon rational argumentation, and they have expanded
these arguments into ever more spheres of experience, even those once considered
beyond debate.
This intersubjective discourse is, for Habermas, emancipitory. This occurs not only
because agreements are communicatively achieved, and thus "free" (because humans
are forced to take ever more responsibility for their actions and utterances), there is also
a logic of equality that Habermas finds, unavoidably, within the rational argumentation.
Actors have had to assume that the conditions for an unlimited and unconstrained
discourse have been achieved and that all participants are sufficiently free from internal
and external constraints, and thus the agreement has been decided based only upon the
force of the better argument. It is assumed that each has an equal opportunity to express
their views, and each has assumed responsibility for their claims to validity. It is from
this "idealized" relationship between actors in argumentation that we derive the notion of
the universalization of normative validity claims, and the ideas of freedom and equality.
Habermas's exploration of the human capacity for technical knowledge of the
objective world found this knowledge insufficient to explain fully the realm of human
actions he identified. This capacity was supplemented with a practical knowledge of the
social world shared by human beings, in order to describe our ability to mutually
understand one another. In addition, in order to understand how human beings relate to
their own inner, subjective worlds, Habennas argues that it is necessary to allow for a
critical realm of knowledge as well. Only with these three separate, but complimentary,
sets of knowledge does Habennas feel it is possible to fully represent the way humans
act in the world, interact with other individuals, and also remain distinct in their own
views of themselves. Having then seen the manner in which Habermas incorporates
his idea of technical, practical, and critical knowledge into the objective, social, and
subjective realms of action, the next chapter will integrate these ideas with the
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epistemological demands made from the empirical, standpoint, and postmodern schools
of feminist thought.

CHAPTER IV:

TOWARD A
COMMUNICATIVELY STRUCTURED FEMINISM

This thesis first examined the rifts that exist between differing schools of thought in
feminist political and social theory concerning their conception of scientific knowledge,
the role of social existence within science, and the ability of science to produce
knowledge which is universally legitimate. This review has shown feminist concern for
these ideas split into three distinct schools of thought; those empirically oriented, the
standpoint feminists, and the postmodernists. Second, this thesis turned to examine the
way that Jiirgen Habermas has dealt with these same issues in his theory of
communicative action and discourse ethics. From the outset of the examination of
Habermas's theories, we were introduced to his belief that human knowledge is possible
in three realms, the technical, the practical, and the critical. The present chapter now
moves to demonstrate the ways in which a communicatively structured understanding
of science, as found in Habermas's works, can resolve many of the differences that exist
between the themes of feminist theories examined in chapter two of this thesis. The
challenge here will be to demonstrate how the many claims for an acceptable theory of
feminist epistemology, made by the three schools of feminist thought, can be shown to
exist within Habermas's three interwoven realms of human action: the objective, the
social, and the subjective. Aspects of each school of feminism will be shown to be
compatible with a communicative ethic, and where some specific claims of a school
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may be unacceptable, it will be shown that the fundamental concerns of those theorists
are compatible with a communicatively structured feminism.
In order to accomplish this, it must be shown that communicative action is able to
account for the variety of demands made by feminist theory. First, in order to avoid
losing the benefits of analytic science, a proper role should be established for the claims
of empirical feminism. Their task of "objectively" explaining and describing the world
as it exists around us remains both useful and necessary for feminist theory. How
communicative action accounts for objectivity will need to be shown useful for
describing the world. A feminist theory that seeks knowledge of the world, and a
trustworthy description of changes to be proposed and accomplished will continue to
rely on many aspects of empirical theory. Further, in a world of concrete individuals it
is important to account for the lives of actual people and to identify concrete changes
and improvements in their lives. Second, the claims made by the standpoint theorists,
to account for the embodiedness and contextual embeddedness of human beings, must
also be accounted for. Specifically, a science will need to account for the role that
women play in their relations with others, not accounting for them as further atomistic
individuals, which standpoint theory claims has been detrimental for women in the
many male-oriented theories of the past. Again, communicative action will need to
prove that it is capable of accounting for these demands. These claims, however, must
be tempered by the needs of postmodern theory in order to determine the degree to
which this new theory will allow an individual to exist as an individual, guaranteeing
one not be assigned a particular way of being. This idea is fundamental to any feminist
movement which seeks to separate the lives of women from the roles that have long
been assigned to them in social life. But, as has been shown, feminists are also wary of
too much individualism, and argue against falling into the abstractness that arguably
accompanies a postmodern emphasis on the individual's distance from other beings. A
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balance must be found between these competing and seemingly mutually exclusive
claims, a balance that communicative action will be able to provide.

To respond to these claims, it will be necessary to examine many of the bases of
communicative action, including its handling of empirical science, the role of the
lifeworld, and Habermas's understanding of an individual's autonomy. The role which
communicative action allows for technical knowledge, empirical claims about the
world, will be shown as incorporating the claims of empirical feminists, while
providing a way of moving past the limits of empirical knowledge as demanded by
standpoint and postmodern theorists. Social knowledge, accounted for in an
understanding of the lifeworld, must be shown to meet the demands of embodiment
and contextuality argued for by standpoint theory. It will also be seen to account for
standpoint claims of politically oriented knowledge, focused upon participation, rather
than a neutrality toward the status quo. Finally, it will be shown how communicative
ethics also takes seriously the demands of postmodemism, considering an individual's
unique identity, and one's ability to be free of a pre-determined way of being.
It is also appropriate to ask, with Sandra Harding, "Why do feminists need an
epistemology at all?" I Postmodemists have vehemently argued that there has already
been too much "policing of thought" and that epistemology tends to rationalize the
beliefs of the powerful and eventually legitimize exploitation. Why do feminists need to
reproduce this cycle? For Harding, and many other feminists, the answer is three-fold.
First, feminism needs a defense against and an alternative to objectivism, which insists
on a value-free, disinterested defense of the status quo. Equally, feminism needs a
defense against and alternative to relativism, which cannot provide a basis for judging
between justice and injustice in social life. Finally, feminism relies upon an

I Sandra

Harding, "Feminism, Science, and the Anti-Enlightenment Critiques," 87-90.
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epistemology to end male domination. A feminist epistemology could help expose and
demystify understandings of male and female social relations, energizing both to work

for the emancipation of women in all social contexts.
Further, inquiry into feminism's need for an epistemology may also seem to imply
that the needs and values of feminism are theoretically prior to a more strictly
philosophical account of epistemology. This is countered, however, by feminists who
argue that it has usually been the case that philosophical inquiry is preceded by social or
political agendas, pointing to evidence of the traditional agenda to exclude women from
serious philosophical investigation. 2 Miranda Fricker, in agreeing with this account of
a gender-biased tradition, points out that as a part of Western philosophy, feminism is
not unique in bringing a political agenda to epistemology, but is rather simply making
this agenda explicit in its investigations. 3 The implications which this will have are not
yet fully apparent, but, she argues, it is clear that the project must be two-fold, both
deconstructive and reconstructive, something must be built back, where the old has been
tom down.

EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE

The goal of empirical feminism, to produce accurate, objective descriptions of the
world based on the sensory experiences of individuals, is also the aim that Habermas
attributes to the human capacity for technical knowledge. As has been explored,
feminist empiricism accepts the tenets of philosophical realism, assuming the existence
of the world independent of human "knowers." Empirical feminism argues that sexism
2see Genevieve Lloyd, The Man of Reason: 'Male' and 'Female' in Western Philosophy
(London: Methuen, 1984 ).
3Fricker, "Knowledge as Construct," 95.
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and androcentrism are identifiable biases of individual actors which can be removed by
a more strict application of the existing norms of empirical science. The absence of any

bias in science is to be equated with the achievement of objective knowledge, which is
understood as providing an unmediated truth about the world, "it frees substantive
knowledge about reality from the distorting lenses of particular observers. "4 We have
seen, however, that many feminists refuse to accept this understanding of science,
claiming that it has led to the exclusion of women and a continuation of their
oppression. The strong thesis of these anti-empiricism feminists, however, calling for a
rejection of all that is identified with this type of science, also leaves feminist theory in a
weak position, without a regulating ideal of truth or value and without a trustworthy
description of the world. Thus, some feminist writers have sought to re-work a type of
empiricism that will provide the desired functions while furthering the project of
emancipating women from their subordinate position in society.
Habermas has written about empirical science as well, concerning its proper role and
the need to supplement it with a more complex understanding of human capacities for
know ledge.

In the theory of communicative action, and more clearly in later writings,

he argues for the necessity of empirical science, as well as its incompleteness. The need
for an empirical knowledge is strong in Habermas's writing, for he remains as much a
sociologist as a philosopher, and throughout his works, he has attempted to remain free
from a purely transcendental foundation for his theory, which he considers too abstract
to be fully convincing. 5 Habermas's intent, in his theory of communicative ethics, is to
build an empirical theory "with strong universalistic claims." He argues that this is
possible because his theory is as much based in empirical claims about the role and

4Mary Hawkesworth, "Knowers, Knowing, Known," 329.
5Rasmussen, Readin~ Habermas, 94.
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nature of language in human social life as it is about the emancipatory potential that
exists within this language use. He follows closely the works of science based on
empirical methods of Durkheim, Mead, Weber, and Piaget, as each incorporates a
philosophical idea into the context of his empirical research. To achieve a full
understanding of the lifeworld that human beings exist within requires knowledge of the
"whole spectrum" of human knowledge, not only the "fruits of science and
technology. "6 Thus, in comparing the demands of feminist empiricism to the role of
empiricism that Habermas argues for, it will be shown that a rejection of empirical
science is not appropriate and instead, an acknowledgment is needed that a greater range
of know ledge is possible and can be pursued in philosophical and social inquiry.

'Realist'

Knowled~e

In developing her idea of an acceptable feminist epistemology, Fricker argues for the

importance of a feminism to be able to account for a "mind-independent reality placing
normative constraints upon what we may correctly believe about the world. "7 She
asks, "What would it mean ... to be committed to the eradication of poverty, or of
violence against women, without a realist commitment to the empirical proposition
that. .. whole communities are periodically wiped out by famine, or that many women
suffer domestic violence and other forms of attack by men ?"8 Any realist account must
be backed by empirical claims, in order for them to be listed as reasons for political
beliefs or action. Feminism must be allied with an epistemology that allows us to
appeal to states of affairs as rational constraints upon political thought. In her account of

6Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 18.
?Fricker, "Knowledge as Construct," 98-99.
81bid., 99.
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feminism, a realist view of knowledge is necessary for empirical beliefs to count as
normative constraints upon our beliefs and actions.
Habermas accounts for the traditional understanding of subject-object relations in
two ways. First, in his conception of rationality, he provides a "realist" account such
that a rational actor engages in activities that are "goal-directed, feedback-controlled
interventions in the world of existing states of affairs. "9 Further, communicative action
accounts for empirical claims in its conception of action. For Habermas there are two
fundamental types of action, that oriented toward success, and action oriented toward
reaching an understanding. While, as explained above, he holds that action oriented
toward understanding is prior to action for success, action towards success is still
necessary and is further separated into social and nonsocial components. Nonsocial
action oriented toward success Habermas refers to as "instrumental action," social
action oriented toward success is "strategic action." Action oriented to success is

"instrumental when we consider it under the aspect of following technical rules of
action and assess the efficiency of an intervention into a complex of circumstances and
events." Action oriented to success is "strategic when we consider it under the aspect
of following rules of rational choice and assess the efficacy of influencing the decisions
of a rational opponent." IO Thus, when feminist theorists such as Fricker demand that
we be able to be philosophically committed to the correcting of unequal physical
circumstances or that we take action against the unacceptable treatment of one individual
by another, communicative action allows us certainty in these convictions. This realist
knowledge is also able to act as a reason for action, as Habermas argues instrumental
action is valid because of technical rules, and strategic action is taken because of the

9Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, 11-12.
I Olbid., 284-286.
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rules of rational choice. Fricker further argues that this knowledge should place some
limits upon our normative beliefs. Habermas, by accepting experiential knowledge as

legitimate, also commits communicative action to these limits and avoids a
commitment to social values that do not reflect an agreed upon interpretation of the way
the world exists.
These actions are a part of the theory of communicative action, and actual aspects of
human life. They are not, however, a complete understanding of social existence, as
this form of action does not explain how mutual intelligibility or coordination of actions
is possible to actors engaged in action oriented toward success. For this, a more
fundamental understanding of human interaction is needed and action oriented toward
success must be augmented by the addition of action oriented to understanding. That
communicative action is prior to strategic action remains a fundamental claim for
Habermas, and forces us to step beyond the claims of empirical science made by both
feminism and this part of communicative action, and into the claims made concerning
the fundamentally social nature of a suitable epistemology.

Role for Objectivity
Within the feminist debate over the nature of technical knowledge there is a need to
determine whether or not the notion of objectivity ought to play a role in knowledge
claims. One criticism of objectivity arises from the empiricists who accept the goals of
objectivity, but argue that in practice objectivity has not yet lived up to its own
standards. Other arguments, notably from the standpoint theorists, hold that objectivity
is neither achievable or desirable, as it is irredeemably androcentric and tied to a version
of knowledge not compatible with feminist needs. Finally, postmodernists argue
against objectivity as a feature of epistemological foundations, which it is argued, are
either repressive or do not exist. Within these diverse critiques lie two more
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fundamental considerations relevant for feminist theory. First, is the debate over
whether or not objectivity is possible to achieve in a knowledge claim. Second, is
whether or not, if objectivity is possible, it is desirable for feminists. I I
Before considering these two possibilities, it is necessary to clarify what "objectivity"
is understood to mean, and why it has been understood as a valuable and beneficial
characteristic of knowledge. Ismay Barwell explains this as follows:
When objectivity was a characteristic of a theory, the theory was
supposed to provide accurate explanations of how and why things
happened as they did. Accuracy or truth were valuable either because
they 'could be relied upon' or because they had intrinsic value. It is this
connection which is crucial. The ultimate value of objectivity lies in this
connection with truth and truth must be preserved as a regulatory
principle in at least some theoretical enterprises. I2
Feminism remains a movement for social change and requires descriptions and
analyses of human social life that allow judgments about justice and injustice. These
judgments will require a trust in the description of how things are. This has not,
however, committed the idea of objectivity to any type of "view from nowhere," or to a
"complete justification" of knowledge claims.
For Barwell, the value that remains in the goal of theoretical objectivity resides in the
notion that the goals of objectivity are non-arbitrary; they apply to every actor
considering the notion based on an agreed upon understanding of the constitutive goals
of the idea of "objectivity." Thus, it will be necessary to build a sufficient compatibility
among the principles of objectivity which are used by differing groups. This ideal
would necessarily be self-regulating according to standards which were not in danger of
being arbitrarily co-opted by either individuals or groups. What these standards might

1 I This division is made in Barwell, "Towards a Defense of Objectivity," 80.
l 2Jbid., 81-82.
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be remains unexplored in Barwell's analysis, but there is another feminist who explores

further the role of objectivity in feminist theory.
One of the strongest proponents of the need for continued objectivity in feminist
epistemology is Sandra Harding, who, writing from a feminist standpoint, argues that
women are better able than men to achieve a true objectivity. This notion, which she
considers "transformed" from the old notion of objectivity, has the potential to be
improved into a "strong objectivity." Examining the characteristics of this objectivity,
and the benefits she argues are derived from it, will show whether or not the objectivity
available in communicative ethics might also meet with Harding's concerns.
Harding's objectivity is not achievable by one group or an individual, and is only
available to a society with the inclusion of marginalized groups into the process of
legitimizing knowledge. This is important because culture-wide beliefs often serve as
legitimate evidence in scientific inquiry, and only the inclusion of those groups rejected
by the majority culture will allow an unbiased conclusion to the debate. The objectivity
that is characteristic of traditional empiricism is too weak, as it fails to set about to
identify all of the historical-social "desires, interests, and values that have shaped"
scientific agendas, allowing these beliefs to shape science. Traditional objectivity was
also limited in that it excluded certain groups that held beliefs which were considered
"different from the accepted notions of science. Harding also feels that not all values
need to be excluded as "bad." For example "democracy-advancing values" have
systematically generated less partial and distorted beliefs than others." 13 Traditional
objectivism weakens its attempts to maximize objectivity because it turns away from
critically identifying all of those broad, "historical social desires, interests, and values"
that have shaped past history. These weak, traditional notions of objectivity created an

I 3 Harding, "Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology," 71.
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idea of "objectivity" based on a mystic notion, allowing it to be perverted by dominant
groups. Those values that encourage the participation of more groups, especially those
that have previously been left out of the production of knowledge are good, and ought to
be included in the investigation of human affairs.
To achieve these new standards of objectivity in social understanding, Harding
provides us with the process of "reflexivity," which gives strong objectivity the ability
to avoid the mysticism of objectivism, and encourages the participation of marginalized
groups. Harding's notion of "strong objectivity," however, should not be confused with
traditional notions of this idea, as it differs from that notion in many ways. Objectivity
in traditional science refers to some characteristic of a knowledge claim, characteristics
that it should or should not possess. Harding's "strong objectivity" seems more to refer
to a process for creating a type of knowledge that is acceptable to the many different
groups that are affected by that knowledge, this acceptability seems determined by
validity. Harding does not reject a political agenda for her notion, nor strive to make it
value-free. Instead of these claims, Harding's objectivity is specifically "democracy
enhancing" and aimed at rooting out gender injustices, and would somehow work to
provide a voice for the opinions of those outside of powerful circles. Her purpose is to
ensure that might does not make right in knowledge production. This more open
process requires an understanding of what others think of us and our beliefs and
actions, not just what we think of ourselves and our ideals. Strong objectivity "is useful
in providing a way to think about the gap that should exist between how any individual
or group wants the world to be and how in fact it is." 14
Returning to Habermas, these very same concerns are found in his understanding of
discourse ethics. He provides a method of legitimizing beliefs and know ledge open to

14Jbid., 72.
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all concerned with the outcome. While he argues that the ability of science to describe
the world as it is still fundamentally remains, claims about how knowledge should
affect diverse individuals remain for these individuals to negotiate, and should not be
decided only by a few. Where Harding only alluded to some method of arriving at this
consensus in validity, Habermas provides us with his complex notion of reaching an
understanding amongst actors in discourse ethics. Further, his process of diversifying
knowledge claims, Harding's "reflexivity," he refers to as "decentering" one's
understanding of the world, achieving the same goal of greater participation in the
knowledge forming process.
For Habermas this discussion of scientific objectivity is included in his
understanding of the process that actors in a communicative situation must undergo in
order to reach a mutual understanding about something in the world. In this process,
actors not only use speech acts to represent a state of affairs in the world, they are also
creating or renewing interpersonal relationships, based on the legitimately ordered
interactions of the social world. Further, what Harding vaguely referred to as how an
individual "wants the world to be," Habermas argues for as the subjective world,
accounted for in those speech acts in the expression of the lived experiences of
individuals, to which they alone have access. Whether or not these individuals in
communication have reached an agreement is indicated by the acceptance or rejection
that each participant gives to the validity claims made with every utterance in the debate.
When one actor rejects a validity claim, she is claiming that "the utterance is not in
accordance with either the world of existing states of affairs, our world of legitimately
ordered interpersonal relations, or each participant's own world of subjective lived
experience." 15 Thus Harding's concern for both individual and group differences from a

l 5ttabermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 137. Italics in original.
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dominant norm are not excluded from consideration in Habermas's process of reaching
agreement, but remain a part of the negotiation. When all of these voices are included in
knowledge production, knowledge from all three of these worlds, Harding's "strong
objectivity" can be achieved.
We have seen then, that Harding does not so much rely upon the nature of objectivity
as possessing a special quality which provides a better source of understanding feminist
knowledge, but instead finds the most benefit in the process that must be undertaken to
achieve "strong objectivity." It seems that instead of emphasizing the importance of
objectivity itself, a theory could arrive at an equally "objective" knowledge by
emphasizing the role which individuals or groups play in the acquisition of knowledge
judged reliable and valid by the whole. As we have seen, this is precisely where
Habermas seeks to emphasize the importance of objectivity, in a process that provides,
not a mystically endowed bit of knowledge, but rather a unit of knowledge that is
accepted by all in debate over the value of that knowledge as legitimate.
Further, the concerns of Barwell, about the agreement between groups who may
hold differing conceptions of objectivity, and about the need for some self-regulatory
standards upon which objectivity must lie, can be found in Habermas's ideal speech
situation. As was explored above, this set of circumstances must apply to a degree that
each individual feels has been sufficient to consider an agreement rational. All who
desire to participate must be allowed to, they must be free from any internal or external
constraints, and they must be free to debate any aspect of the argument. These
standards are self-regulatory and are needed for any rational agreement which is to
convince participants of its validity.
Leaving this chapter's consideration of Habermas' s use of empirical knowledge we
see that communicative action has accomplished a number of the tasks outlined at the
beginning of this section. It has been shown to fulfill the need for access to knowledge
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of how the world actually exists. Feminist theory does not exist in isolation from a real
world of events and situations, which must be responded to by these theorists. In order
to respond to these facts, feminists need an accurate and trustworthy knowledge
responsible to the norms of empirical science and placing constraints upon how this
knowledge is interpreted. Through its acceptance of such a science, and a notion of a
communicatively achieved objectivity, communicative action accomplishes just this.

SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE

We have seen, communicative action contains an important role for empirical
knowledge, and is able to account for the demands a feminist science would make for
objective, "realist" knowledge of the world. Within this first step in comparing
feminism and communicative action, however, already lies the need to expand the
empirical explanation of knowledge beyond a simply positivistic account of the world.
Habermas has accepted this task, and presents an expanded notion of rationality, beyond
what the realist vision allows, by proposing a theory of human action more varied than
action simply oriented towards success in the world. A more fundamental
understanding is necessary; one based upon language, the human ability to
communicate, and our need to exist amongst each other and with ourselves. As will
now be demonstrated, these concerns closely resemble those that initially turned
feminists away from the limits of atomistic empiricism, toward a more informed notion
of human social life, dependent upon those around us for our identities, and united in
some form of solidarity. This will be demonstrated in the compatibility of feminist and
communicative conceptions of context, truth, and solidarity.
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Contextuality

Allison Jaggar has written that a feminist theory cannot be based on the abstract
individualism of Cartesian thought which assumes that essential human characteristics
arise prior to any social context. Jaggar, arguing for a feminist standpoint, feels that
meaning is given to inner experience and behavior only by the emotions, beliefs, and
attitudes supplied by our social context. As argued above, the idea of a "pre-social
human being without any determinate kind of nature is conceptually incoherent." 16
Habermas agrees. and his use of action theory, and socialization through the lifeworld,
insure the necessity of a social context. Indeed, not only is his theory founded upon the
communicative nature of social activities, it discusses clearly the role of raising and
socializing young members of society as part of communicative action. As explored in
its own chapter above, the theory of communicative action denies neither our physical
or social existence. Differences in biology are not removed by the theory, there is no
neutrality that removes these aspects of existence. Based upon these claims, a
standpoint such as Jaggar's will be able to identify with the embedded subjects of
communicative action.
Iris Marion Young points to another advantage Habermas's theory would provide
for feminism. Her writing has called for a new public/private distinction in social and
political theory which is also compatible with Habermas's theory. Following the
feminist slogan "the personal is political" Young wants to redefine the private not as
what has been excluded from the public, but rather to define private as what an
individual excludes others from. This would be characterized as "withdrawing" rather

16 Allison Jaggar, Feminist Politics and Human Nature, 42.
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than being kept out. I7 Modem politics, she argues, is characterized by an over
emphasis on reason, which excludes any passion from the public sphere. She argues
for two new principles which would deny a social division of the spheres differentiating
institutions and human activities. In order to allow open discussion over new topics
such as, the sexual division of labor or sexual violence, no social institution or practice
ought to be excluded from public discussion or debate a priori. She also argues that no
aspect of a person's life or their actions ought to be excluded from the public and forced
into the private. This would allow differences of age, sex, or race to become part of
public discourses. These demands would lead to the liberation of public expression to
include discussion of both ends and means, reasons and passions, all of which
feminists seek to incorporate into social life. The principles of discourse ethics, again,
are that no one be excluded, that any claims may be made and criticized, and that no
coercion may enter the discussion. These principles should surely satisfy the demands
of Young for a new, more open and inclusive, understanding of public and private in
public dialogue.

Consensus Theozy of Meaning and Truth
For many feminists a fundamental reason for rejecting previous philosophies has
been the lack of female voices in their construction of regulatory ideals, and feminist
bases for accepting new ideals have been to see that women's voices are included in
their creation. On an even more basic level, the norms of an epistemology must be
justifiable to women as well as men. Ideas central to philosophy such as knowledge,

171ris Marion Young, "Impartiality and the Civic Public: Some Implications of Feminist
Critiques of Moral and Political Theory, in Feminism as a Critigue: On the Politics of Gender, eds.
Seyla Benhabib and Druci11a Cornel1 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 74.
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justification, or reason need not be abandoned, but remain to be struggled over,
redefined and reworked until acceptable to the notions of modem social actors.
Arguing that an ideal of truth is needed, transcending situated perspectives as a
regulatory ideal, Miranda Fricker writes that an acceptable feminist epistemology must
provide a strong role for political and social values. 18 Further, this feminism must be
constrained by two provisions. One, it must provide an account of norms as providing
the basis for beliefs, and second, it must distinguish between first and second-order
perspectives in order to provide some capacity of self-criticism. The first provision is
intended to direct our attention to the idea that there are some things that we ought to
believe in order to constrain us from believing "anything at all." These beliefs must be
presented to the subject with normative force, in order to be enforced and accepted. The
second rule is a continuation of this, and must epistemologically account for how it is
indeed possible for human beings to critique their actions.
In building an acceptable idea of knowledge she proposes a theory which is
accountable to experience, but not fully determined by it. With the incorporation of
political and social values into epistemology, she will also provide a role for political
argumentation in order to regulate the unavoidable influence of these political interests
into a dialectic of facts and values. This acknowledges that political values, as well as
empirical "facts" influence our beliefs. Thus, there is no need for a sharp categorical
distinction between facts and values. All beliefs in the system of beliefs become
interdependent, justification for one depends on its coherence with the rest of the
system, and the first rule she proposed is accounted for. If a realist account of empirical
belief is depicted as normatively constrained by the world, then norms have provided
empirical beliefs.19
18fricker, "Knowledge as Construct," 95-109.
I 9Jbid., 106-107.
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In communicative ethics, Habermas certainly accounts for both of these
epistemological demands, an understanding of the relationship between norms, beliefs,
and empirical information, as well as a very detailed understanding of an individual's
ability to critique her social world. His "consensus theory of truth and knowledge"
allows an active role for normative beliefs to inform what is held as an empirical truth,
as well as what is to conform with social demands for legitimacy. Recall from above
the weight that Habermas places on validity of claims in the determination of truth, "the
concept of truth combines the objectivity of experience with a claim to the
intersubjective validity of a corresponding descriptive statement, ... "20 Thus the idea of
truth is only possible in a community that is tied to the same interpretations of
statements. If speakers and listeners are able to identify when a statement is true, or
accepted as valid by the community, then they also have access to the meaning of the
statement. The meaning of utterances cannot be understood without also knowing the
conditions of the statement's validity.2 1 Truth depends on the "idealized agreement" that
occurs when an individual is able to relate the notion to an ideal communication
community, one sharing a collective identity and the goal of reaching agreement on
discussion about the organization of their lifeworld. How Habermas moves from the
relation of facts and intersubjective validity of statements to criticizable validity claims,
as well as Pricker's need for "first and second order perspectives" for a critical
examination of our beliefs will be accounted for more specifically in the section
concerning critical knowledge below.

20ttabermas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 2, 72.
21 Habermas ... Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, 276-277.
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Solidarity
In building a coherent epistemology for feminist theory, the agents of knowledge

must be carefully theorized to provide a role for both the identities that individuals can
claim as part of a group and the identity they claim as unique to themselves. These
demands are apparent in many aspects of feminist theory, and one of the most
important arguments they have made in support of the notion of solidarity is the need
for a theory to appropriately account for an individual's position in a community. This
is especially true of feminist standpoint theories, who depend on the notion that
differing positions within a social structure are able to provide different perspectives
from which to view that society, one of these perspectives often being more privileged
than the others. For standpoint feminists, it is generally the position of women in
society, subjugated into that position as a social group, that holds a privileged position
over the perspective of men. Nelson's understanding of epistemological agents
describes them as not being "isolated or isolatable." Feminists from many camps have
argued that an atomistic knower is impossible, based on reasons of human biology, 22
others have argued against claims that human knowledge is personal property, and
insist instead on "interpersonal relations" as being the actual source of human
knowledge.23 As Jaggar has written, the very discovery of a women's standpoint
depends on the "collective process of political and scientific struggle. "24

22ttelen Longino, often categorized as a feminist empiricist, has argued for plural accounts of
knowledge in Science as Social Knowled~e· Values and Objectivity jn Scientific Inquiry,
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). Alison Jaggar uses biological arguments for
pluralistic understanding of knowledge in her Feminist Politics and Human Nature.
23 Nelson, "Epistemological Communities," 121-160.
24Jaggar, Feminist Politics, 371.
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To Habermas, the mere existence of an individual, and any of her capabilities, also
depends upon a social setting for both socialization and the capacity to know herself as
an individual. "In communicative action, the suppositions of self-determination and
self-realization retain a rigorously intersubjective sense: whoever judges and acts
morally must be capable of anticipating the agreement of an unlimited communication
community, and whoever realizes himself in a responsibly accepted life history must be
capable of anticipating recognition from this unlimited community. "25 This unlimited
community, as we have seen, is the result of moving through an identification of the
actual community around the individual and substituting the notion of this unlimited
community in place of the actual one. The actual community is necessary for the
individual to make any decisions about the good life, and the expanded notion of the
community is required to make any decisions about morality. In both instances, the
role of community, and the individual's place in it, remain centrally important to the
individual's ability to make life choices. The individual remains indebted to the
community for her individuality.
Lynn Hankinson Nelson has recently written that:
By current lights it is persons, embodied and situated in specific social
and historical contexts, who know, with both their embodiment and
"situations" relevant to their knowing. According to feminist
epistemologies, such situations need to be specified using the analytic
category gender, a category whose "content" and meaning are dynamic
and multileveled and one whose relationship to other categories and
social relations (e.g., class, culture, and race) as well as to knowledge,
remains both contested and central to feminist theory. 26
This notion of "situation" or "location," she continues, is becoming more complex in
feminist theory, and functions as a "bridging" principle for diverse feminist

25 Habermas, Postmetaphysical Thinkini. 192.
26Nelson, "Epistemological Communities," 121.
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epistemologies, whether empirical, standpoint theorists, or postmodemists.27 The
"contest" referred to above, over the relations of analytic categories, is further described
as one undertaken by the agents of knowledge themselves, as opposed to the "passive"
recipient or collector of knowledge characteristic of Cartesian knowledge. "These
agents also differ from their predecessors in foundationalist epistemologies in that they
shape, as well as undergo and absorb, experience; they construct meaning and
knowledge-even, some say, negotiate and decide these. "28
Turning again to Harding's standpoint theory for women, we see also that her
"strong objectivity" relies on an important position for groups. Her argument is
dependent upon the existence of groups who will form the same sense of identity
amongst themselves, and in opposition to other groups. It is the various ideas of these
differing groups that must be accounted for in the production of knowledge. While it
has usually been the case that a dominant group in society-white, wealthy, males-has
determined what was to count as acceptable and legitimate knowledge, it is now
understood that true and impartial knowledge cannot be achieved without the input of
non-dominant and marginalized groups in society. Harding leaves us, however, at the
point of identifying the importance of the process that allows groups to negotiate
amongst themselves for a knowledge claim. She does not describe what this process is
to look like, or articulate the rules under which it will proceed. But it is certain, that
within strong objectivity, Harding's primary epistemological agent is not the individual,
but the group or community, that must struggle to have its own unique voice heard.
For Habermas, the role of community in knowledge production is no less important.
Habermas 's understanding of the life world, as explored above in detail, argues

27Ibid., 152, note 1.
28Ibid., 121.
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specifically that the knowledge of an individual is dependent upon the cultural traditions
handed to her by the community in which she is socialized. Habermas has responded
to these needs by accounting for both "individuality and solidarity" within his theory.
Justice and solidarity are two sides of the same coin because practical
discourse is, on the one hand, a procedure that affords everyone the
opportunity to influence the outcome with his "yes" or "no" responses
and thereby takes account of an individualistic understanding of equality;
on the other hand, practical discourse leaves intact the social bond that
induces participants in argumentation to become aware of their
membership in an unlimited communication community.29

CRITICAL KNOWLEDGE

These two realms of knowledge, that of empirical knowledge of the objective world
around us and the practical knowledge which guides and coordinates our actions in the
social world, do not however, fulfill the demands made upon a social science by either
Habermas or writers in the feminist camp. To do so will require paying attention to the
claims and demands made by feminists more closely allied with postmodern thought,
and the related thinking of Habermas on individuals' ability to know themselves, and to
exist as unique entities within the larger group where that identity is acknowledged.
This final area of knowledge will be explored in this section, which incorporates
Habermas's ideas of critical knowledge and its role in emancipatory human interests
with the fears of postmodern feminists about essential descriptions of human nature and
the totalitarianism brought with many foundational social and political theories. This
third section will undertake an examination of these ideas, showing that Habermas
meets the demands of postmodern feminists, while at the same time not abandoning the
technical and practical bases of knowledge already established. This section will also
29Habermas, Justification and Application, 154.
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address some of the critical reviews communicative action has received from feminist
theory.

Gender Bias
Nancy Fraser begins her examination of the theory of communicative action with the
question: "in what respects does Habermas's critical theory clarify and/or mystify the
bases of male dominance and female subordination in modern societies?"30 She begins
by reviewing a distinction within communicative action between the lifeworld and the
political/economic system it supports, which she points out, provides a powerful view
of the public-private split of concern to many feminists. To explore this dichotomy she
uses four concepts to represent the four categories created by a public-private and
system-lifeworld matrix: family, (official) economy, state, and the public sphere.31 At
the systems level, there is a distinction between the public state and the private official
economy. At the lifeworld level there is the distinction between the family and the
public (social) sphere. The private sphere links the economy and the family while the
public sphere connects the state and the public sphere of social "will formation."
Fraser argues that there exists a gender bias in Habermas's theory by pointing out
that these distinctions, in male-dominated, capitalist societies, rely upon traditional sexroles. To illustrate this, she first takes the case of the wage laborer. There is a strong
sense, she argues, in which the worker is seen to be male. It is the male that leaves
home to enter the private, economic-system in order to "bring home" the means of
support to the family. Thus, only men create this link between these two private
(economy and family) spheres. There is also a feminine subtext to the link of private

30Nancy Fraser, "What's Critical About Critical Theory?" 114.
311bid., 114-117.
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roles, via a woman's role as the consumer of goods. In capitalists families, it is
generally the female who is the consumer, while the male is at work, thus the link in the
private worlds between economy and family, via the consumer, is distinctly female.
Finally, for Fraser, it is a significant deficiency in the theory that Habennas makes no
mention of child rearing in the link between the economy and the family. There is no
mention of the unpaid labor that is fundamental to the rearing of children, and is also
generally a female role.
Habennas also seems to rely upon a gendered subtext to link the public spheres. For
this, Fraser points to the role and concept of the citizen. In traditional capitalism, the
role of the citizen is also seen to be a typically male role. This citizen has the ability to
vote and the ability to engage in political debate and opinion formation. While
Habermas does not mention gender roles in this context, Fraser notes that these
activities are historically male. There is a more fundamental part of citizenship that
Fraser points to which further points to the gendering of citizen, the role of soldiering.
The role of soldiering is to protect the state and the family (women and children) who
cannot protect themselves. Therefore the link between the protection of the state, and
the role in public debate are characterized by traditionally masculine roles. Habennas
remains dangerously androgynous on both the links between the systems and lifeworld
spheres.32
In conclusion, Fraser does not entirely reject Habermas's theory. She generally
attributes it's weaknesses to "blind spots" of androgyny. She concludes with three
changes that would need to be made in a "feminist critical theory." First, she points out
that a feminist framework could not separate the male-dominated family and the stateregulated economy into the two primary, separate categories of domination. Second, a

32Jbid., 127-128.
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feminist theory cannot assume that influences move in only one direction in social life,
norms, even as they weaken, continue to influence both institutions and social life.
Finally, it must focus more exclusively upon the "evil" of domination and
subordination, rather than upon simply the faults in welfare-capitalism. 33
These criticisms of a private and public distinction within Habermas's theory of
social rationalization do not, however, significantly weaken Habermas's claims about
the three-fold nature of knowledge. The lifeworld/system distinction within
communicative action that Fraser critiques is used by Habermas as a method to describe
the process of cultural rationalization, to illustrate the inadequacy of instrumental
rationality, and identify crisis points within the lifeworld, not to ascribe an essentialism
to men and women. That these roles are unalterable is an assumption of Fraser.
Focusing her critique upon two aspects of Habermas's thought ignores the more
fundamental distinctions Habermas relies upon in the nature of knowledge. While
Fraser is able to critique communicative action by attributing to it responsibility for the
way the world appears today, this is not a fault of communicative action which
Habermas argues is used only to describe, not prescribe. Further, Fraser misses
entirely the subjective aspects of communicative action in which Habermas
acknowledges the importance of an individual's ability and desire to reject standard
values or aspects of the community. Finally, while the lifeworld/systems dichotomy
does exist within communicative action, this does not form nearly so fundamental an
aspect of the theory as the three realms of human action, which are not foundationally
tied to a particular gender.

33Jbid., 138.

121

Considerin~

Communicative Rationality

Iris Marion Young critiques the rationality inherent in critical theory.34 She argues
that an emancipatory ethics must break away from modern political ideas, developing a
conception of normative reason which is not based upon an opposition between reason
and desire, for this contrast has been used by traditional theories to exclude the
experiences of women from discourse. Her attack on Habermas is that, while his
theory offers a good departure towards such an ethic of reason and desire, he still relies
too heavily upon the ideas of impartiality and universality.
Impartiality begins with the idea of an observer standing apart from a situation and
judging without having any role in or connection to the situation. This requires the
impartial observer to assume a normative rationality based on a situation that does not
exist. Rationalizing in this way simplifies and removes otherness from the specific
situations and specific individuals and assumes a kind of authoritarianism which need
not take into consideration any point of view other than its own. An integral part of a
feminist theory would need to remove this universal authoritarianism of reason.35
Habermas, she acknowledges, has been able to move away from the authoritarianism of
impartiality. His rationality is based on the give and take of reasons in argument, of
being reasonable and to being willing to talk and listen. Thus, truth and rightness are
reached through discussion, not through intuition or with tests of consistency which
removes reason from its great height. Also encouraging to feminist ethics is that
communicative action considers statements about art and opinion as equally valid as
factual statements. 36
34Jris Marion Young, "Impartiality and the Civic Public," 57-76.
35Ibid., 61-63.
36Ibid., 68.
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Habermas, however, still retains some commitments to impartiality and to an
opposition between reason and desire. Habermas writes that all participants enter
discourse reasoning from the perspective of their experiences and need not leave behind
their motives and feelings. As long as all participants can speak freely, motives and
feelings will not have strictly private significance, and thus will not bias the outcome of
a discourse mixed with other needs and feelings. But, Young feels, in Habermas's
commitment to consensus as a basis for this discourse, desires become neutralized.
Young feels this is a transcendental argument in that it imposes an abstract restraint
upon the motives of real participants in the discussion.37
To Young, Habermas must assume that utterances have a single meaning, and are
understood in the same way by all participants. This further limits the knowledge that a
participant can bring to the discussion and relies upon several "unities." First, a unity of
speakers, who must be assumed to know and faithfully represent their desires. Second,
a unity between subjects that share the same meaning of words. Finally, a unity in the
relation between the word spoken and the object in the world that it represents. 38 Young
also feels that Habermas ignores or devalues the "expressive and bodily aspects of
communication. "39 Reason based on the goal of reaching consensus, and limiting its
functionality to argumentation, unnecessarily limits the richness of language. This
ignores the other aspects of communication, jokes or metaphors, as well as other goals,
the sharing of care and love.
In reading Habermas, however, these attacks seem misconstrued. The "consensus"
which Young fears seems not to be an "abstract restriction upon the motives of

37Jbid., 69.
38Jbid., 69.
39Jbid., 70.
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individuals" but rather a necessary condition for meaningful communication. Actors
may not want to achieve a mutual understanding, but this is at the cost of intelligibility,
and no "communication" follows. Second, Young misses the role of misunderstanding
in communicative action. Habermas acknowledges that misunderstandings occur, and
that every utterance must be checked against background understandings. If the actors'
backgrounds do not sufficiently overlap they must engage in "repair work" to reach
sufficient common understanding. Every act of communication potentially will be
misinterpreted and need to be repaired.40 Finally, Young has written that Habermas
ignores the expressive bodily aspects of communication. Referring to Habermas,
however, we see that he directly accounts for bodily movement in his definition of
actions which are incorporated into his understanding of communication.41 As for the
"richness of language" that Young feels Habermas ignores, it is difficult to see how
aspects of communication like the "sharing of care and love" are excluded by discourse
ethics which refer specifically to social and subjective worlds, about relations with
others and feelings towards them, respectively.
Marie Flemming argues that communicative action remains irreparably incompatible
with feminist demands because of its basis in an misogynist conception of reason.42
Flemming attacks Habermas as being either "unaware of feminist critiques of
modernity or, even worse, unconcerned about them."43 She bases these claims first, on
the absence of sex-gender questions in Habermas's works, and second, upon the
argument that "his adoption of a naturalistic stance toward logic ensures that his account

40Habennas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 2, 124-126.
41 Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. I, 96-97.
4 2Marie Flemming, "Women's Place in Communicative Reason," 25-262.
4 3Ibid., 258.
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will reproduce dualistic categories that are repressive for women. "44 Habermas's
communicative reason, she claims, continues to rely upon the philosophy of the subject
and legislates women as 'Other' and irrational.
These criticisms themselves, however, seem incompatible. First, without
mentioning women or gender in his theories, it is complicated to see how this legislates
a repressive treatment of women. Her argument is based upon a reading of Albrecht
W ellmer's argument that Kantian monologism is based in a community, and thus based
in dialogue. From this, Flemming determines that "autonomous reason is already an
implicitly communicative reason ... and cannot be justifiably viewed as fundamentally
different and competing traditions. "45 Rejecting Habermas's communicative rationality
because it is no different than the rationality of Kant's atomistic legislating individual,
however, seems to disregard the important separations from Kant that Habermas
undertakes in the role of a situated, historical, individual engaging in discourse with
other actors to establish mutual understanding.
Her attack that Habermas is "unaware" or "unconcerned" with feminist critiques of
modernity also seems inaccurate. While this paper argues that the major thrusts of
feminism revolve around critiquing the application of empirical reason, the neglect of
contextuality, and the need to represent individual identities, Flemming's rejection of
Habermas, is based upon his response to Nietzsche's postmodern questioning of the
"value of values themselves. "46 She argues that communicative action reproduces the
dualism that is inherent in the traditional values of Enlightenment philosophy,
"good/bad, true/false, mind/body, rational/irrational, man/woman," leaving women

44Jbid., 259.
45Jbid., 256-257.
46Jbid., 255-256.
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identified with all that is to be devalued. None of these dichotomies, however, are
overly central to communicative ethics, which is more fundamentally based on the

tripartite distinctions between realms of action, knowledge, and rationality. There is no
fundamental "true or false" in communicative action; instead, Habermas argues for an
emphasis on "truth, rightness, and sincerity" as foundational values. Habermas also has
replaced a traditional "mind/body" distinction with a richer understanding of the
difference s between the objective, social, and subjective realms of human action. The
remaining dualism central to Habermas's thought is the yes or no response that is given
by any communicatively competent individual, male or female, to an utterance made by
another individual. This does not seem to assign women an "irrational" role, nor does
this simply ignore postmodern attacks on modernity's values.
Seyla Benhabib writes to defend a role for a type of "universalism," which must be
included in a feminist theory if they are to separate themselves from the imposed roles
of situated communities. Her idea of universalism is different in several ways from the
strong, deontic universalism found in many empirical theories. A "feminist
universalism" would need to be interactive rather than legislative, cognizant of gender
difference rather than gender blind, and sensitive to context differences rather than
situation indifferent. This universalism is arguably found in Habermas's
communicative action.47
As has been explored above in this essay, there is a firm place for contextual
relations in communicative action. Through discourse ethics, Habermas commits
actors only to the norms and values that have arisen in their specific communicative
context, and fully accepts that different norms and values will arise in different
situations. We can also see in Habermas the shift toward an interactive rationality. This
4 7 Sey la Benhabib, Situatin~ the Self: Gender. Community And Postmodernism In
Contemporary Ethics (New York: Routledge, 1992), 4-5.
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can be found in his definition of truth, which is no longer substantive, derived from an
objective reality to be grasped, nor does it rely upon a particular state of the human
mind. In returning to Habermas's understanding of the three worlds we inhabit, the
objective, social, and subjective, none of these has a monopoly on truth. Instead,
Habermas argues for truth based on consensus which becomes linked to validity, and
thus relies also upon sincerity and the appropriateness of the claim, as well as its
objective appearance.48
Another theme of Benhabib's work is the necessity of a moral theory to account for a
"concrete other" in moral reasoning that works in addition to the "generalized other" of
more traditional liberal moral theorizing. A generalized other excludes differences in
moraJ reasoning and focuses upon only those aspects common to all participants. In the
past this aspect of theories has often worked to exclude women as "different," bringing
claims to moral reasoning that were not the same as men's. A "concrete other" in moral
reasoning allows individuals to remain distinct and different in whatever way they
choose, and thus, as they actually are. Discourse ethics, as provided by Habermas, is
able to account for this need for a generalized and concrete other. In discourse ethics, a
moral perspective is to be part of an actual dialog, not a theoretical process, and without
placing limits on the information that a participant can bring to a discourse. Benhabib's
support of discourse ethics allows us to see an escape from androgynous universalism
that feminists argue against, without falling into standpoint theory's inescapable
embeddedness. Discourse ethics also provides a successful method of reasoning as we
actually are, engendered and concrete beings.

48Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, 70-72.
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Non-Foundational
There are many feminists who argue against the foundational and meta-theoretical
aspects of traditional notions of knowledge and science. Feminists argue against the
foundational nature of a theory of knowledge because of what they interpret as its
tendency to be used to universalize certain aspects of experience, while at the same time
excluding others. Habermas has also taken steps to show that communicative action
can be understood as being free of foundational claims or ultimate justifications, which
he feels is a weak position for a philosophy to attempt to defend. Transcendental
analysis he argues, is a non-empirical argument for achievements for which there is no
alternative, "arguing to prove the "nonsubstitutability of certain mental operations that
we always already perform in accordance with rules. "49

For Habermas, the correct

role of philosophy is to mediate between the realms of knowledge that human beings
are capable of orientation towards. 50 Communicative action is built upon an empirical
claim concerning the nature of language, its development, its functions, and its use in
social life. As Rasmussen reads Habermas, "the theory of communicative action
attempts to become, ... a quasi-scientific theory and not a venture in foundational
epistemology. "5 1
One such anti-foundational feminist, Jane Flax, argues for a close alliance with the
postmodern trend of contributing "to the growing uncertainty within Western
intellectual circles about the appropriate grounding and methods for explaining and
interpreting human experience. "52 While she makes this claim in order to step away
49ttabermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 2.
50Jbid., 14-16.
51 Rasmussen, Readin~ Habermas, 23.
52flax, "Postmodernism and Gender Relations," 41.
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from a overly strong feminist standpoint, she also points out the necessity for feminism
to take part in the work of casting doubt upon Enlightenment ideals of a coherent self or
an objective foundation for knowledge.
Writing on the same theme, Fraser and Nicholson work to connect the goals of
feminist and postmodern attempts to "develop social criticisms which do not rely on
traditional philosophical underpinnings. "53 Specifically, they are hoping to show that
philosophy can no longer play the role that it once did as a ground to social criticism and
politics, because, they argue, contemporary social life has reached a point were "grand
narratives of legitimation" are no longer believable. Modem foundationalist
epistemologies and moral and political theories have been criticized by both feminists
and postmodemists as being contingent, partial, and historically situated, while being
presented as universal and ahistorical. 54 Fraser and Nicholson here are criticizing both
traditional forms of philosophizing and the standpoint feminists use of "very large
social theories" which claim to "identify causes and constitutive features of sexism that
operate cross-culturally." 55 The chief place of error in these theories is that they are
"not sufficiently attentive to historical and cultural diversity, and they falsely universalize
features of the theorist's own era, society, culture, class, sexual orientation, and ethnic,
or racial group. "56 While they feel it is not the "size" of these theories that condemns
them, it will be important for a feminist theory to "replace unitary notions of woman
and feminine gender identity with plural and complexly constructed conceptions of

53Fraser and Nicholson, "Social Criticism Without Philosophy," 21.
54 Jbid., 26.
55Jbid., 27.
56Jbid., 27.
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social identity ... "57 They continue, without offering details, that "In general, postmodern feminist theory would be pragmatic and fallibilistic. It would tailor its methods
to the specific task at hand, using multiple categories when appropriate and forswearing
the metaphysical comfort of a single feminist method or feminist epistemology. "58
"Multi-leveled," "pragmatic," and "forswearing a single method" all resemble the
structure of communicative action and discourse ethics. More importantly at this time,
however, is the argument that Habermas also makes that his theory avoids any
foundationalism. Habermas has written that he hopes to find a more modest role for
philosophy than that of "usher and judge" of the sciences. As Habermas sees it, the
proper role of philosophy is not to differentiate and appropriately limit the various
realms of modem life. This is a task that philosophy cannot accomplish. Instead,
Habermas feels that the differentiation of these realms is a given in today's world.
Philosophy is left (without claims to a totality) with the role of mediator between these
realms, adjudicating between the various spheres. 59 Habermas does not want to allow
philosophy the power to clarify the foundations of science once and for all, which
would define the limits of what can and cannot be experienced. This would be equal to
showing the sciences their proper place. 60 For individuals to mutually understand one
another in Habermas's lifeworld will require a cultural tradition that "ranges across the
whole spectrum, not just the fruits of science and technology." Philosophy will be able
to play a role in the communication and intelligibility between the "cognitiveinstrumental, moral-practical, and aesthetic-expressive dimensions" of human

571bid., 34-35.
58Jbid., 35.
59Rasmussen, Readin~ Habennas, 21-22.
60Habennas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 2.
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knowledge which have arisen. The issue now is "to overcome the isolation of science,
morals, and art and their respective expert cultures. "6 1
Perhaps this role of philosophy as mediator between realms of knowledge that
Habermas envisions is the same role that Haraway seeks in her postmodern "manifesto
for cyborgs" faithful to "feminism, socialism, and materialism. "62 Her central image of
a cyborg is to represent the need for understanding of the relationship between "machine
and organism," between "social reality" and "fiction." Her essay dwelt on the
breakdown of boundaries, and the need to take responsibility in their changing. She
writes of the confused boundary between human and animal, often reduced by biology
and evolutionary theory to an ideological struggle. 63 Second, she considers the
differences that remain between the physical and the non-physical world, the lines
between imagination and spirituality and technology and materialism. Habermas's
thesis of the confusion of these boundaries, and the need for a mediation between them
is an idea not alien to postmodernists at all.

61 Habermas, Moral Consciousness and

Co~municative Action, 19.

62Haraway, "Manifesto for Cyborgs," 190.
63Ibid., 193.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION:
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION AS FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGY

Feminist political and social theory today still faces a dilemma, as the
epistemological discord within feminist theory has not yet been resolved. Being
composed of at least three distinct and often mutually exclusive schools of thought, it
has been difficult for feminism to maintain a consistent attack upon the social and
political structures it seeks to change. Feminist empiricism, standpoint feminism, and
the postmodern feminists each stand upon their own entrenched philosophical grounds,
making their distinct demands for an acceptable feminist epistemology, and attacking
other positions as weak or misguided. None of these schools, however, is immune to a
critique of its own position, and the inconsistencies of each or all of them suggest the
need to move beyond the separate and specific demands of each towards a more
comprehensive, coherent, and powerful understanding of "feminist ways of knowing."
While a growing number of feminist theorists acknowledge the need for this new
direction for feminist thought, there is as yet no single theory able to account for all of
feminism's epistemological requirements.
This thesis has suggested, and demonstrated, that a possible source of enlightenment
for this next step in feminist thought is provided by Jtirgen Habermas. His theory of
communicative action and discourse ethics seeks not only to defend some of the
Enlightenment against the attacks of postmodemism, but also to enrich and clarify our
understanding of human social life. In order to accomplish these tasks, Habermas has
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grounded his claims concerning what is known and knowable about human life upon a
detailed understanding of human knowledge. It is this complex notion of human
knowledge, and its differentiation into the objective, the social, and the subjective realms
of human action, that is able to account for the diverse epistemological demands of
feminist political and social theory.
It has been shown that the three realms of Habermas's knowledge account for the
underlying claims of the differing groups of feminist theory, and provide a basis for
reconciling the differences between them. Habermas's objective realm of knowledge
corresponds to the concerns of empirically oriented feminists. Need for an accurate
description of the events and conditions of the real world, as well as a trust in the human
potential for grasping these objects and events accurately, is provided by communicative
action and necessary for any feminist epistemology. Standpoint feminism's concern for
interpersonal relations, accounting for the context of an individual's or group's existence,
is reflected by the type of knowledge that Habermas considers practical in nature.
Habermas's conception of our capacity for social knowledge, which guides our actions
with other human beings, is shown to be dependent upon both social existence and
human abilities to communicate with each other. Finally, Habermas acknowledges the
human potential for critical knowledge to explain the individual's ability to differentiate
herself from the group, a task which a postmodern concern within feminism demands
in order to avoid essentializing any aspect of women.
The shared concern for accurate knowledge of the physical world and the human
need for both solidarity and autonomy has been shown to be present in both feminist
theory and communicative action. Within the theory of communicative action
Habermas has implied what would necessarily be the type of political organization
needed in order to realize the social order he visualizes. Some feminist scholars have
also pursued their theories in order to uncover what an acceptable "feminist politics"
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might resemble. The politics of empirical, standpoint, and postmodernist feminism
find compatibility with the politics that a communicative ethic advocates.
The politics envisioned by a feminist standpoint can be drawn out from the example
of Harding's strong objectivity. For Harding, "strong objectivity requires that scientists
and their communities be integrated into democracy-advancing projects ... " I She argues
for a scientific project and political order that is specifically biased towards the inclusion
of more and more groups of actors. This is not only argued to be a benefit in the
objective world of sciences, and in the political realm of social order, it benefits actors
subjectively as well as, by creating less distorted beliefs about the social system.
Harding's goal of conducting political inquiry with a bias toward greater democratic
procedures is intended to further increase the degree of democracy at work in these
procedures.
A discourse ethic would placate the demands placed on politics by Harding in that its
constitutive rules require the participation of all that might be affected by an established
norm, those powerful in a society as well as those marginalized by it. Further, a social
conception based on communicative action assures us that not only do groups have the
ability to add to the debate over their good life, the participation of the marginalized will
be required for the outcome to be rational. Harding's writing also is concerned with the
ability of the scientist in a society to determine what will be reflected in the norms of
that community. Habermas, while certainly convinced of the threat that an elite group
could gain control over the establishing of legitimate cultural norms, has specifically
established his procedures so that such an occurrence would be unlikely to occur, or if it
did, certainly it would be judged and exposed as non-consensual, and non-rational.
There is no room in the participatory scheme of Habermas for a single "true" voice to

I Harding,

"Rethinking Standpoint Epistemologies," 69.
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determine what is legitimate, for unlike other theories in defense of rationality, the
terms, subject matter, and conditions of the debate are not to be determined in advance,

but left solely up to the argument of the participants.
Fraser and Nicholson have written that the most important advantage of a
postmodern feminism would be its usefulness for the political practices of
contemporary feminism. 2 For them, feminism has become a matter of "alliances rather
than of unity around a universally shared interest or identity." Feminist politics needs to
recognize the diversity of women's experiences and reflect the notion that no single
solution will solve all of the challenges facing women. Politics must reflect that while
there are commonalties, none are universal, and that commonalties are strewn
throughout with differences, even conflict. The solidarity of women needs to be
accounted for in a manner "broader, richer, more complex, and multilayered." Iris
Young, inspired by feminist postmodemism, argues for a "politics of difference"
described as a "political vision of inexhaustible heterogeneity." This politics realizes the
oppressiveness of assumptions about the unity of women, and respects the importance
of acknowledging the specific differences between women. Alcoff and Potter write
that the terms and project of feminism today must address virtually all forms of
domination found in social contexts, not simply gender-based domination. This is
because women exist in all of the classes and ranks and categories of human beings. 3
Habermas's hope with a discourse ethics is to allow the greatest diversity and
participation possible in his ethics. At least one description of the politics necessary for
a communicative politics labeled it a "radical democracy. "4 It follows from

2Fraser and Nicholson, "Social Criticism Without Philosophy," 34-35.
3 Alcoff and Potter, Feminist Epistemolo~ies, 4.
4Rasmussen, Reading Habermas. note I 0.
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Habermas's theory that the principles of radical democracy are built into the very
structure of language. This stems from the nature of rationality that is built into
language, and the notion that rationality, once it is apparent, seeks its full range of action
and is thus laden with an emancipatory potential.
For Thomas McCarthy, Habermasian politics would be characterized by
"unrestricted deliberation in the democratic public sphere. "5 For in communicative
action the basis of political sovereignty arises from the popular use of reason in a variety
of public arenas, voluntary associations, social movements, or the mass media. This
use of reason by the public is transferred into administrative power by legal institutions.
Habermas works deliberately to decenter political power into multiple and differing
arenas for "detecting, defining, and discussing society's problems and the culturally and
politically mobilized publics who use them, serve as the basis for democratic selfgovemment and thus for political autonomy."6 Further, because the public use of
reason is reflexive, as the use of reason demands to be fully realized, these public
debates are necessarily open and reflexive. This is why Habermas has limited his
explanation of the process to the procedure that is to be followed in public discourse,
and leaves all of the substantive questions and answers of social life to be determined by
the debating public.
In conclusion, Habermas's communicative action provides an acceptable unifying
epistemology for the needs of a feminist political and social theory working to
emancipate human lives from social oppression. This stems from communicative
action's ability to account for the complex notions of autonomy and solidarity in a way
that draws upon the strengths of both, without becoming tied to the powerful claims of

5McCarthy, "Kantian Constructivism and Reconstructivism," 63.
61bid., 49.
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either. While this simplification of the issues seems to detract from the complexity of
the problem, Habermas himself has narrowed the question to a single statement, most
clearly characterized by his long study of a phrase by William James, a maxim that in
Habermas's words, "asserts the reciprocal dependence of socialization and
individualization, the interrelation between personal autonomy and social solidarity, that
is part of the implicit knowledge of all communicatively acting subjects":?
The community stagnates without the impulse of the individual,
the impulse dies away without the sympathy of the community. 8

7Habermas, Justification and Application, 114.
8William James, quoted by Habermas, Justification and Application, 113.
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